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A postal survey was conducted in 1998 amongst a sample of 800 National Maize Producers'
Organisation (NAMPO) members in the major maize producing regions of South Africa, namely
the Northwest Province, Mpumalanga and the Free State. Study objectives were (1) to measure
the extent to which large-scale commercial maize farmers were using, and intended to use,
alternative maize marketing strategies which have evolved since the abolition of the Maize Board
in 1996, and (2) to identify the business and personal factors influencing their use of price risk
management tools (forward contracts, futures contracts, and options).
The average age of respondents was 47 years. Respondents had a mean of 24 years farming
experience and 14 years of formal education. They grew an average of 918 ha of maize annually,
whilst mean annual turnover per farm was R 2.9 million, of which 68 percent was derived from
maize. Seventy-two percent of respondents reported owning a personal computer for use in the
farm business, and of these, 37 percent had Internet access. Farmers generally rated their skills
in marketing management lowest relative to other aspects of management. Respondents had a
better understanding of forward contracting than the more complex concepts of Futures contract
and Options trading on the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX).
Most respondents used a portfolio of maize marketing channels in order to spread price risk in
accordance with a sequential marketing strategy. Results indicate that sample maize farmers are
making increased use of the forward contracting market relative to the spot market, while on-farm
use of maize is also increasing. Both the percentage of respondents using SAFEX and the
percentage of the value of the annual maize crop in the sample regions that was hedged on
SAFEX increased markedly over the three-year study period. The hedging ratio - defined as the
ratio of the crop hedged to that unhedged - rose from 27 percent in 1997/98 to 49 percent for
1998/99 and a projected 50 percent in 1999/2000.
Amongst maize marketing intermediaries, elevators (eg. cooperatives and former cooperatives)
handled approximately half the value of the annual maize crop in the study areas, and commercial
users (eg. Millers) directly bought 15 percent of respondents' maize. Small traders/agents handled
roughly 10 percent, and large traders (eg. Louis Dreyfus) another 10 percent of study farmers'
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annual maize crops. No users of currently operating Internet-based maize trading systems were
identified.
Survey respondents were classified as lower- and higher- level users of price risk management
tools, based on their scores for an index of price risk management use. The index took into
account three aspects of price risk management behaviour exhibited by sample respondents: the
use of forward pricing mechanisms, the number of different marketing channels used, and the
relative proportions of the producer's annual crop passing through these channels. Higher-level
users of price risk management tools tended to operate larger farms, and be younger, less
experienced, but more educated, computer adopters who were less likely to individually own their
operations.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate the effects of respondents'
business and personal characteristics on their scores for the index of price risk management. The
use of maize storage facilities, off-farm employment, use of formal crop insurance, operators'
number of years of formal education and the proportion of farm turnover arising from maize all
positively influence sample farmers' use of price risk management tools. Both the scale-
dependent benefits and fixed transaction costs associated with using price risk management tools
can be spread over a larger volume of output as the volume of maize marketed increases. The
Operators' self-rated score of marketing management ability was negatively related to the use of
price risk management tools, in contrast to the findings of previous studies in the USA.
Many respondents indicated concern about a lack of competitiveness in the local spot market, and
perceived that large maize buyers were manipulating maize prices. Farmers should use SAFEX
Agricultural Marketing Division (AMD) Futures prices as guidelines in "discovering" prices
when negotiating with maize handlers and millers about cash maize sales. Producers should also
monitor their local basis (the difference between the local spot price and the nearby Futures price)
to identify opportunities for the profitable transportation and/or storage of maize.
A need was identified for further education of maize farmers regarding the use, costs and benefits
of available maize marketing alternatives. Weekly agricultural magazines and maize marketing
seminars may be the most effective mediums through which to inform maize farmers about prices
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and marketing services. Further research opportunities were identified in the monitoring of
farmers' maize marketing activities as the South African maize market matures, and in
establishing recommended hedging ratios for South African maize farmers.
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Maize was the second largest contributor (R 4.7 billion), after poultry, to the total gross value of
agricultural production in South Africa (R 38.2 billion) in 1997. The crop is consistently planted
on more than 40 percent of South Africa's arable land annually (Directorate: Statistical
Information, 1999). South African maize production is concentrated in the Northwest province,
Free State and Mpumalanga which, respectively, accounted for 32 percent, 33 percent and 21
percent of average annual maize production in the five years since 1993/94 (Directorate:
Statistical Information, 1999).
The marketing of maize in South Africa was highly regulated from the early 1930's until the mid
1990's, with the crop being marketed through a single-channel system administered by the Maize
Board, which also set producer prices. Pressure for agricultural commodity market liberalisation
mounted in the 1980's and culminated in the abolition of most agricultural commodity controi
boards - including the Maize Board - by the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996
(Mielies/Maize, 1997a). Minimal tariff protection against maize imports, commencing below an
equivalent US dollar price (currently US$ 100/ton), is the only remaining government price
support for South African maize producers.
The deregulation of a market does not necessarily imply that it will automatically become a
competitive market. Preliminary interviews with certain role players in the South African maize
industry revealed that there is a perception that the maize market in South Africa is far from
competitive and that prices are being manipulated to the detriment of farmers. The deregulation
of maize marketing has placed the responsibility for the marketing of this important agricultural
commodity in the hands of individual producers, who now probably face considerably more price
risk. A variety of new farm-level maize marketing alternatives have consequently evolved in
recent years and the marketing channels that farmers employ to market their crop are changing.
Flexible, sequential marketing strategies allow farmers to spread sales over time, thereby
managing price risk (Musser et al. , 1996:66). Three main markets have emerged for maize in
South Africa: the spot (cash) market, forward contracting and the derivatives (Futures contracts
and Options) market. Producers may now sell maize to whoever they please for whatever price
they can get in the cash (spot) market, or forward contract their crop to assure prices prior to
harvest (van der Merwe, 1998). The derivatives market involves the trading of Futures and
Options contracts, usually through the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX). Physical
delivery of maize is generally avoided, but acceptable price levels are "fixed-in" prior to delivery
(Futures contracts), or minimum prices are guaranteed, with potential left for gains from positive
price movements (Options contracts) (Frank, 1992). Some other innovative marketing alternatives
to emerge include Internet and electronic cash marketing.
The objective of this study is to identify which marketing alternatives that South African
commercial maize fanners are using and to what extent these alternatives are currently being
used. The influence of the personal and business characteristics of the farm and farmer on
farmers' marketing choices will also be examined and results will be made available to
participating marketing institutions (eg. SAFEX) and farmers. To the author's knowledge, no
South African studies have yet identified how farmers are marketing their maize since the demise
of the Maize Board. Previous international studies have tended to focus on the adoption of a
single marketing alternative in isolation, this study examines farmers' use of a range of
substitutable price risk management marketing alternatives.
The study instrument is a postal survey questionnaire sent to a sample of 800 National Maize
Producers' Organisation (NAMPO) members in 1998 in the major maize producing regions of
South Africa: the Northwest province, Mpumalanga, and the Free State. This information wili be
compared with measured farm business and farmer characteristics to identify factors that
significantly influence producers' use of various marketing alternatives. The way in which
farmers adapt to market deregulation can influence their marketing choices. Both agribusiness
firms and policy makers need to be aware of what factors influence these choices so that they can
formulate appropriate services and adjust to farmers' changing needs. This information may also
help firms and government to identify what type of farmers are more likely to use, and benefit
from, their respective services and policies. The results of this research will be sent to various role
players in the South African maize industry, with a view to improving maize marketing services
currently offered to local farmers.
This thesis first examines the characteristics and history of South African maize marketing to
provide a background for interpretation of the study results. The role that Information Technology
may play in local maize marketing is then considered. Next, the study outlines the maize
marketing alternatives currently available to commercial South African maize producers, with
special reference to price risk management tools. Previous research on topics relevant to the
subject of this thesis is then reviewed to identify gaps in the local literature on the use of maize
marketing alternatives. The development of the postal questionnaire and sample selection are then
discussed before the results of the study are presented and interpreted. Management and policy
implications of these results are considered in a concluding section.
CHAPTER 1
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND HISTORY OF MAIZE MARKETING IN SOUTH
AFRICA
The maize market in South Africa has been characterised by a high degree of Government
intervention in the past. This has come at a high net cost to society. "Intervention results from
perceived market failure and results in political failure where interest groups manipulate
government for their own benefit" (Wright and Nieuwoudt, 1993:51). However, mere government
withdrawal from, and deregulation of a market is, in itself, no guarantee that the market will
automatically tend towards perfection. Stock markets, which are often considered to most closely
resemble perfect markets, are highly regulated. Appropriate institutions enforce the "rules of the
game" and promote the competitiveness of these markets, maintaining the confidence of market
participants (Nieuwoudt, 1998). This Chapter outlines the history and characteristics of the South
African maize market.
1.1 The history of the South African maize market
Historically, the marketing of maize has been subject to a high degree of government intervention,
which started with the Mielie Act of 1931 (Vigne, 1996). A single-channel marketing system
administered by the Maize Board persisted from 1944/45 to 1995. Maize could only be sold to
the Maize Board or agents of the Board (eg. cooperatives) in the major maize-producing regions
of South Africa. Under this system, the producer price of maize was supported and fixed. Initially
this price was based mainly on production cost estimates and was released just prior to harvesting
under a "single channel, fixed price" system (Van der Vyver and Van Zyl, 1989). Producers thus
had an incentive to overestimate their production costs.
In 1986 the price determination procedure was altered, with market supply and demand conditions
becoming the primary determinants of the maize price. An indication of the expected price was
given as a "price scenario" which was announced at the beginning of every season to ensure that
production was market oriented (Maize Board, 1996). This "single channel pool scheme" was
maintained until 1995 and represented a shift in policy towards a more liberal maize market. In
May 1995 a "surplus removal export pool system" of marketing was installed. Under this scheme,
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single channel marketing on the domestic market was abolished. The Board, however, continued
to be the sole marketing channel for exports, the price of which served as a floor price in the
market. During regulation, South Africa was a net exporter of maize. The volume of surplus
production available for export varied considerably with variations in the national harvest. The
Maize Board maintained a stabilisation fund to accumulate any export profits to compensate for
losses incurred on exports in subsequent years but losses significantly outweighed profits (Maize
Board, 1996).
Many academic studies highlighted the high social costs of the Maize Boards' distortion of price
signals (Groenewald, 1985; Frank, 1986; van der Vyver and van Zyl, 1989; van der Merwe, 1990;
Wright and Nieuwoudt, 1993; Willemse and van Zyl, 1995). The Kassier Commission and
Agricultural Marketing Policy Evaluation Committee (AMPEC) reports to government advised
market liberalisation. The Maize Board was finally disbanded in April 1997 after the passing of
the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996 (Mielies/Maize, 1997a). The assets of the
Maize Board have been taken over by the Maize Trust, details of which are given later in this
document.
1.2 Characteristics of the South African maize market
Producers may now sell maize to whoever they can for whatever price they can get. This
increased freedom in marketing has resulted in increased exposure to price risk but has also
provided producers with new marketing opportunities. South African maize production is
concentrated in the Northwest province, Free State and Mpumalanga which consistently produce
over 80 percent of the country's crop (Figure 1.1).
Other (14.00%>)
_ ^ ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ 7ree State (33.00%)
Mpumalanga (21.00%)
Jorthwest Province (32.00%)
Figure 1.1 Regional contribution to
SA maize production (1993/94-97/98)
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Aggregate production, consumption, imports and exports of maize in South Africa over the period
1989/90 to 1995/96 are shown in Table 1.1 to illustrate the wide variation in local maize
production and the more constant nature of local consumption. The market for maize in South
Africa is characterised by price inelastic supply and demand (van Zyl, 1986). The aggregate
supply of maize can be considered price inelastic in the short to medium-term because there are
few established alternative crops to maize in many regions of South Africa. The quantity of maize
produced in any year is largely a function of climatic conditions rather than price signals, leading
10 large shifts in the maize supply curve and there are relatively long adjustment lags associated
with maize production. White and yellow maize can be considered perfect substitutes in
production, although white usually commands a higher price than yellow (Frank, 1986).















































Source: Maize Board (1996)
Demand for maize comprises mainly of human and animal demand, which together account for
more than 95 percent of consumption. The remaining five percent comprises industrial demand.
White maize is used mainly for human consumption and yellow maize for animal consumption.
Animal demand for maize has been steadily increasing due to the increased importance of maize
as an animal feed, especially for poultry, whilst human demand for maize is relatively constant.
Human demand for maize has been shown to be relatively less price elastic than animal demand
but demand for both is considered price inelastic as few substitutes are available (van Zyl, 1986).
In the current freer market situation, the price-inelastic nature of maize demand and seasonal
shifts in maize supply result in volatile maize prices. In some years domestic supply of maize
exceeds domestic consumption resulting in an exportable surplus. In other years deficits occur,
necessitating maize imports (eg. in 1992/93). South African maize prices may thus vary between
the landed import and net export realisation prices (van der Vyver and van Zyl, 1989). The size
of this price difference, and thus the degree of possible local maize price fluctuation, is dependent
largely on transport costs to and from the rest of the world (Frank, 1992). Major world maize
markets are situated far from South Africa and are themselves characterised by volatile prices, and
international transport costs are considerable. Within South Africa, transport costs are also high,
leading to large regional price differences between localities (Elliott, 1994). In addition, the
supply of maize is strongly seasonal, being concentrated in the harvest period of approximately
two months, whereas demand for maize is spread throughout the year. Seasonal maize price
fluctuations thus also occur due to the costs associated with storage. The abolition of the Maize
Board has increased individual producers' exposure to price risk but has also provided them with
new marketing opportunities. The increased variability of maize spot prices since maize market














Figure 1.2 Maize spot price
variability in S. Africa (1994-1998)
Directorate: Statistics and Management Information, 1997;
SAFEX, 1998
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Maize producers in South Africa face considerable price risk, this is evidenced by commercial
fanners' perceptions of product price variability as a major source of risk in studies reported by
Woodburn et al. (1995) and, to a lesser degree, Stockil and Ortmann (1997). This particular
aversion to price risk is characteristic of many agricultural producers worldwide (Schroeder and
Goodwin, 1994). Price risk, however, is only one of many different types of risk facing farmers
in their overall risk portfolio. The concept of risk balancing behaviour applies (Ferrer, 1998). For
example, farmers who have relatively low exposure to other sources of risk, such as higher than
accepted debt levels, may be less concerned about price risk, since the relative impact of price risk
on their businesses may be reduced by their low overall risk exposure. f>
1.3 Information Technology: its role and potential applications in South African maize
marketing
Rapid advances have recently been made in the field of Information Technology. Computers have
become more effective, more user-friendly and cheaper. Applications of Information Technology
to maize marketing take two general forms, indirect applications (eg. the provision of marketing
information), and direct applications, where actual trading systems are established using the
technology.
Initially, computer applications to farm-level commodity marketing were restricted to internal
information systems such as spreadsheet packages. More recently, external information systems
have become available to farmers, whereby the farmer can access information from off the farm
(eg. via the Internet). Satellite data services exist in the United States of America (US) whereby
relevant information (eg. price and weather forecasts) is beamed to subscribers' houses via a
satellite dish. These systems have met with success in the US but are not available in South Africa
as yet (Lockhorst et al, 1996). Locally, market information is available to subscribers in faxed
form from a company called Agrimark Trends. Agrimark Trends also distributes market reports
to subscribers via an Internet newsgroup service. The rapidly expanding Internet provides many
opportunities to farmers. James (1996) identifies a number of Internet-based services that are
likely to be useful to farmers: Management and marketing information is available through
newsgroups (virtual bulletin boards on specific topics), listservers (electronic mailing lists that
facilitate discussion on specific topics) and the World Wide Web (by "browsing" web pages).
E-mail allows for quick, cheap and easy communication with fellow farmers and experts, as well
as with agribusiness firms. On-line banking is now available in South Africa and may provide
both increased convenience and transaction cost savings to many farmers. Subscribers to such
services may typically pay accounts, check balances, transfer funds, create or cancel stop-orders
and arrange future dated payments around the clock without leaving the farm.
Direct applications of Information Technology have also been made to maize marketing, whereby
maize trading systems were established. Various electronic and Internet-based marketing systems
have been made available to South African maize farmers over the past few years (eg. AGMEX
and Agrilink). Some of these marketing service-providers, however, have failed to gain
acceptance and use by farmers. These services, along with the factors influencing their successes
and failures, are examined more closely later.
1.3.1 Computer use by South African farmers
Previous studies have examined computer use by South African farmers but no published studies
have yet measured Internet access and use by South African fanners. In the USA, Batte et al.
(1990) found mixed grain/livestock farmers to be the most likely group of farmers to adopt
computers. They also noted that farmers' computer adoption rates have lagged behind the rate of
computer development. This assertion is also made for European farmers by Lockhorst et al.
(1996).
Woodburn et al. (1995) investigated computer use and the factors affecting computer adoption
among commercial farmers in Natal. Roughly half (48 percent) of respondents reported owning
a computer. Computers were found to be used mainly for record keeping (financial and
management records), financial planning (budgeting) and payroll purposes. Farmers considered
computers least helpful for making marketing and price analysis decisions. The authors attributed
this to the prevailing lack of freedom in agricultural marketing (at that time over 85 percent of the
value of agricultural marketing fell under government regulation or control). As described in
Chapter 1, the maize marketing environment has changed dramatically since then. Ortmann
(1997:15) considers marketing to be "a farm process with considerable scope for improvement";
computers and information technologies provide farmers with some useful tools with which to
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improve their marketing. Woodburn et al. (1995) found that only 39 percent of survey
respondents considered themselves highly skilled in marketing management, versus 65 percent,
60 percent and 65 percent for production management, financial management and overall
management respectively. Reasons given for not adopting computers included high costs, lack
of confidence in operating a computer and insufficient time to operate a computer. Factors found
to be positively related to computer adoption included farmers' education, gross farm income,
proportion of farm land rented, financial management skills and off-farm employment. A negative
relationship was evident between computer adoption and farmer's age and the presence of a beef
enterprise on the farm.
Stockil (1997) reports that 64 percent of survey respondents in KwaZulu-Natal owned a computer
for use on the farm. This represents a large increase in computer use since the earlier study by
Woodburn et al. (1995). Computer adoption was found to be positively related to farmer's
education, farm size (gross sales) and the number of information sources used in decision-making.
The factors influencing farmers' decisions to adopt computer technology are well documented in
the studies by Woodburn et al. (1995) and Stockil and Ortmann (1997). Computer adoption is an
obvious prerequisite for Internet adoption, as is access to a reliable, direct telephone line.
Thereafter, "a farmer will normally only consider additional information (in this case Internet
access) if the perceived benefits are greater than the costs of time, effort and cash outlays"
(Ortmann, 1997:24).
1.3.2 Marketing-related applications of Information Technology
A variety of innovative marketing-related applications of Information Technology have been
made available to South African farmers in recent years.
1.3.2.1 Provision of market information
Agri-hub is an electronically based market information provider which supplies farmers with the
latest produce prices, industry news, financial news and management advice. Agrimark Trends
is a related company which provides market information for agricultural producers over the
Internet and in written and faxed form. Subscribers are updated weekly with relevant agricultural
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statistics as well as local and international market information. A monthly publication graphically
illustrates market trends to subscribers.
1.3.2.2 Electronic marketing alternatives: AGMEX, A case study
Agri-marketing Exchange (Pty) Ltd (AGMEX) was established in 1995 to provide an electronic
marketing alternative for maize producers. Initially introduced by the Vleissentraal cooperative
for beef and, more recently, adapted for maize marketing, the AGMEX system failed and is no
longer operating. It is, however, pertinent to consider the reasons for it's failure. AGMEX offered
two services: weekly electronic grain sales and a daily bid and offer billboard on the Internet
(http://www.primeresources.co.za/agmex). The Internet bid and offer system operated as a
newsgroup where sellers posted their offers and buyers their bids. A major problem with this
system was that it was not interactive; bids and offers were posted and thereafter it was
complicated for buyers and sellers to revise these prices and negotiate the finer details of delivery
(Dickson, 1998). In addition, trading was thin and continued twenty-four hours a day. This may
have discouraged buyers who may have preferred to have specified trading hours, rather than
having to monitor trading continuously. The bid and offer system also brought together potentiat
buyers and sellers, who could then negotiate sales privately.
The AGMEX electronic auction system was independent of the Internet and utilised the same
satellite-based electronic communication infrastructure that operates bank ATM networks and
pager systems. Buyers first had to pass a credit test and were then allocated a credit limit. Sales
were held on Thursday mornings and sellers participated in the sale via a registered broker. Over
1000 local and international buyers could simultaneously participate in the auction, which was
coordinated by a systems manager at AGMEX. Participants remained anonymous but prices were
visible to all. Commissions were paid by the seller. Participants required a basic personal
computer, a modem, printer and a dedicated telephone line (Cornelius, 1997). The following
advantages of the electronic auction system were identified by AGMEX: Transactions costs are
reduced since, unlike traditional auctions, the product, buyer and seller need not be brought
together at a specific place. Prices are transparent, while participants remain anonymous, prices
are available to all. Greater competition is envisaged between buyers as many buyers may
participate simultaneously. Market access is eased as the market is not at a physical location and
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buyers and sellers from many regions may participate. APEX, a similar system to AGMEX, is
used successfully as the sole milk marketing channel for the Irish Milk Board's sales to
processors. The Irish Milk Board operates under a single-channel marketing system (Grega and
Ray, 1992).
Bunting (1997) identified some drawbacks associated with AGMEX. Interviews with producers
showed that buyers perceived the system to lack credibility and were reluctant to use the AGMEX
system. In times of surplus, buyers did not support AGMEX and prices anticipated by buyers and
sellers differed by R 20 to R 30 a ton. If it were perceived to be credible, most buyers said they
would be prepared to source 10 percent to 30 percent of their requirements on this market. Buyers
perceived that many sellers were using the system to discover values and withdrew lots after
finding out the reserve price. They alleged that some sellers had bid on their own stocks in the
past and that the system did not allow for negotiation of special terms. These constitute
institutional deficiencies. Bunting (1997) recommended institutional improvements to arbitration
procedures and facilities. Buyers' perceptions of price manipulation would also need to be
addressed and the whole system would have to become more transparent and subject to a
management board of stakeholders, as is the case with SAFEX. These changes were not effected
and AGMEX no longer operates.
There is some controversy over the appropriateness of an auction system for maize marketing.
Dickson (1998) reasons that large buyers such as Tiger Oats and Premier Milling all face similar
cost structures and sales prices, implying that their profits are mainly made on their maize
purchases. The electronic auction system is considered appropriate as it reduces transactions costs
associated with buying. There is another point of view that auction sales are suitable '"only for
residual or bargain buying" since marketing margins are so slim that millers cannot afford to be
unsure of the price of their inputs (Gravelet-Blondin, 1998). This explanation would explain the
lack of buyer use in times of surplus. In addition, large mills need a constant, guaranteed
throughput to be cost effective. The auction system cannot make such guarantees. The lack of
buyer support for AGMEX in times of surplus may have been due to agents having a vested
interest in avoiding price transparency since AGMEX may reduce the demand for their services
and buyers may be wary of bidding prices up in an open auction (Dickson, 1998).
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1.3.3 Internet-based marketing alternatives
Agrilink (http://www.agrilink.co.za) describes itself as a virtual agricultural trading and
information centre. They provide a commodity exchange, a classified advertisements section, a
useful address database and links to various sources of worldwide market information. A chat line
is also provided to facilitate discussion on agricultural topics. The commodity exchange is divided
into "field crops", "fodder crops" and "general" categories. A visit to the site showed that
utilisation was low. As at 4 March 1999, the highest volume of bids and offers was in the field
crops category with fourteen offers (only four involving maize) and one bid posted, some bids had
been there for over three months.
The Stockowners Cooperative web page (http://www.agriserve.co.za) hosted a grain bid and offer
system on the Internet. Lots on offer were described in terms of their grade and location. A variety
of goods could be traded through the system. However, the system is no longer operational and
the site is now used to advertise upcoming cattle sales.
The National Maize Producers' Organisation (NAMPO) is investigating the possibility of starting
its own Internet-based maize trading system, posting bids and offers on a local basis (Grobler,
1998). They believe that a well-used bid and offer system will aid price discovery, especially for
farmers in remote areas, and will promote price transparency in the spot market. They would do
well to note the performance of similar services already in existence and try to address the
problems associated with them. Millers interviewed revealed that they would be reluctant to
publish bids for particular locations as their identities would be revealed with such bids since the
ownership and locations of the various mills are well known. A lack of rural Internet access may
also hamper such schemes. Other marketing alternatives have also become available to local
maize producers since the demise of the Maize Board. The alternatives discussed in the next
chapter have helped to broaden the range of marketing services available to South African
farmers.
CHAPTER 2
MARKETING AL TERNA TIVES A VAILABLE TO SOUTH AFRICAN MAIZE
FARMERS
it
Farmers were faced with greater individual responsibility for marketing their maize after the
deregulation of the local market in May 1995. The removal of the floor-price supports that
accompanied the dissolution of the Maize Board in 1997 further increased farmers' exposure to
price risk, making marketing all the more important. A number of new marketing alternatives
have since become available to maize farmers. Broadly speaking, three markets have emerged,
namely the spot (cash), forward contract and derivatives markets. The prices formed by these
markets are interrelated as similar forces of demand and supply affect them. Other alternatives
available to producers include value adding through vertical integration (eg. on-farm milling) and
storage of product for later sale.
2.1 The spot market
The spot (cash) market is an important market for maize as it allows for the immediate disposal
of maize. The demise of single-channel marketing has led to the development of a number of new
spot marketing channels for maize. The spot market serves both as an avenue for the sale of
physical product and as a generator of price information. Supply and demand perceptions have
a great influence on prices. However, the unavailability and unreliability of local information
regarding holding stocks for maize hinders maize price discovery in South Africa (Grobler, 1998).
The unhindered dissemination of market and price information is an important feature of a free
market. Price transparency is critical. Price discovery for the individual producer has become
more difficult since market deregulation due to the dispersal, unreliability and unavailability of
market and price information in the maize spot market.
Different role players hold differing views as to the competitiveness of the maize spot market in
South Africa. NAMPO perceive a mutual distrust between various role players in the industry
whereby parties believe that it is not in their interests to share information (Mielies/Maize,
1997a). Buyers of maize are seen as reluctant to reveal prices for fear of bidding prices up.
Bunting (1997:1) noted "a perception that the maize spot market is being manipulated".Cornelius
(1997:21) points out, "the buyer who is able to control price discovery and the dissemination of
market information, inevitably controls the producer and the marketplace". Simple government
withdrawal from, and deregulation of, a market does not necessarily imply that such a market will
automatically become a competitive market (Fourie and Venter, 1994). Grobler (1998) believes
that there is a need for appropriate institutions to be developed so as to establish the "rules of the
game" and to avoid market manipulation.
There is another point of view, held by certain millers and traders, that the maize spot market is
competitive because milling margins are small and large users must compete with each other, just
to maintain throughput at their mills. Millers and other large buyers freely admit that they do offer
uncompetitive prices to farmers once their plant throughput requirements have been met, in order
to try and get bargains. They argue that farmers simply need to phone the various buyers, traders
and agents in their area to find the best price available.
2.1.1 Maize spot marketing channels
The maize spot market in South Africa is diffuse, local prices differ between regions and are
determined by local supply and demand forces. Transportation of maize may occur between
markets, according to price differences existing between them. If the price differential between
two regions exceeds the cost of transport, there is scope for profitable transportation. Maize may
be sold through a number of channels in local spot markets.
Grain elevators (silo operators), many of whom were formerly cooperatives acting as agents of
the Maize Board under single-channel marketing, continue to play an important role in maize
marketing. Some elevators still operate as cooperatives, others have restructured themselves as
public companies. For the sake of simplicity, these two types of entity will be referred to as
'elevators' in this study. Elevators act as traders, storers and brokers of maize. Maize may be sold
to some elevators outright for their own use (elevators acting as traders), delivered to their silos
and exchanged for a tradable silo certificate (elevators acting as storers) or sold through elevators
to third parties (elevators acting as brokers).
Many processors and end-users of maize, such as millers, animal feed companies and feedlotters,
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buy a proportion of their requirements directly from farmers on the spot market. Larger farmers
and those situated close to such points of use (eg mills) may get premium prices due to reduced
transaction and transport costs. The prices offered at these points of use may or may not be
competitive, depending on the stock situation at the relevant facility.
Maize may also be sold to small traders and brokers who do not own elevator/silo facilities. Here
sales would occur on a "ring and sell" basis for a price negotiated over the telephone. Traders may
be operating on behalf of large buyers or acting as arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs aim to profit from
simultaneous price differentials existing between markets. These markets may be separated by
time or distance. Large international grain trading companies such as Cargill and Louis Dreyfus
also buy maize direct from larger farmers, as well as acting as importers/exporters and
speculators.
2.1.2 Managing price risk in the cash (spot) market
Farmers may manage the price risk they face in the spot market in a number of ways. Seasonal
variations in product price may be managed if sales are spread out over the season and a single
sale of maize is avoided. This comprises a 'sequential' marketing strategy (Musser et al, 1996).
Farmers would then receive an average of the various ruling prices, weighted by the proportions
sold each time. Farmers also use flexible marketing strategies and alter their plans by considering
new market information which may subsequently arise. King and Lybecker (1983:125) define a
flexible marketing strategy as one that "continually reevaluates market information to determine
future actions". An alternative to the immediate sale of maize would be on-farm milling (for
farmers with their own mills or serviced by local contract millers, "bosmeulens"). Maize may also
be used on-farm (eg. fed in a feedlot).The demise of the Maize Board in South Africa has enabled
the private sector to provide alternative price risk management tools to maize farmers to manage
maize spot price volatility. The main alternatives which have developed include forward
contracting and Futures and Options hedging on SAFEX.
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2.2 The forward contracting market
An obvious way for both sellers and buyers to avoid price risk is for the two parties to agree on
a mutually acceptable price or price formula for physical delivery of product on a specified future
date. Forward contracts have become a widely-used marketing tool in the maize industry. Forward
contracts hold a number of benefits for end-users and processors of maize; they guarantee
delivery, they can be tailor made to allow negotiation of terms and provide price risk insurance.
Van der Merwe (1998) observes that the maize industry has developed a number of innovative
forward contracting arrangements:
• Fixed price contracts whereby the maize price payable on delivery is specified in the
contract and is not negotiable. The producer is guaranteed that price and the only price
risk he faces arises if the spot price at delivery exceeds the price stipulated in the contract.
An "escape clause" against "acts of God" may or may not be included in these contracts;
such clauses are increasingly being excluded.
• Minimum price contracts whereby the producer is guaranteed a minimum price for his
crop but, should the spot price exceed this minimum, a higher price is paid. This
arrangement allows producers to benefit from positive spot price movements whilst
guaranteeing them a floor price. Minimum price contracts are a common form of forward
contracting. Bunting (1997) notes one miller, for example, offered a premium price for
50 percent of the contracted crop and then negotiated a price for the balance later in the
season. Large millers often negotiate such forward contracts with both large individual
farmers and with elevators. These elevators may then use these contracts to guarantee
prices to farmers (back-to-back contracting). Under various "pool-price" or "agterskot"
schemes, producers may sell maize to certain elevators for a stipulated base price. The
cooperative then markets the maize and, at the end of the season, redistributes any profits
it made by selling in excess of this price. The cooperative may hedge on the South African
Futures Exchange (SAFEX) or use forward contracts with millers to guarantee base prices
to farmers.
• Forward contracts that include production financing. Here producers are provided with
production finance in return for ensuring delivery according to a pricing structure
stipulated in the contract. Verris Farms offer a variety of such contracts to producers.
Farmers using these contracts need not seek finance from banks and cooperatives but
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should be aware that interest charges on finance provided are often hidden in maize prices
that are not market-related.
One possible drawback of forward contracting is that no formal market yet exists for such
contracts in South Africa. This gives rise to counterparty risk whereby enforcement of contracts
is not guaranteed (SAFEX, 1998). The major role-players in the maize industry have drawn up
a standardised contract which can be used on a voluntary basis to reduce counterparty risk.
Refinements and modifications to this document are on-going.
2.3 The derivatives market
A derivative is a security whose price is determined by, or "derived from", the price of another
security (SAFEX, 1998). The derivatives market includes trading in Futures and Options
contracts.
2.3.1 Futures trading
Futures trading is an evolution of forward contracting whereby physical delivery of the product
is avoided but prices are still guaranteed. The system facilitates hedging against price risk by
trading-off similar profits and losses in two related markets, the cash and Futures markets. The
Futures market trades in contracts to buy or sell a specific quantity of a specific quality of a
particular commodity at some point in time in the future. The Futures price is likely to be highly
correlated with the cash price and the difference between the two is known as the basis.
Theoretically, this includes the cost of storage and, as the contract nears expiration, the basis
decreases until on the due date the cash and Futures prices are equal.
Many different permutations are available to hedgers in the Futures market, an example of one
of these hedging alternatives follows: A producer wanting to hedge against price risk may sell a
Futures contract (go short) whilst a trader wishing to hedge against possible price increases may
buy a contract (go long). Prior to the due date, traders can "close out" their positions by taking
an equal, but opposite position. Traders who are short can buy back contracts and those who are
long can sell back contracts. Few contracts actually result in physical delivery of the product.
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Traders may then sell and source their product on the cash market. If the final cash price is lower
than expected, producers who sold contracts early (went short) then closed out just prior to
delivery would have made a profit on the Futures market that should compensate for their loss
on the cash (spot) market. The corresponding "long" trader would have made a profit on the spot
market to compensate for the loss made on the Futures market. If the final price ends up higher
than expected, the corollary holds. Down-side risk is thus transferred from hedgers at the cost of
potential favourable moves in the market. Risk still faces the hedger as basis risk, risk from
possible changes in the basis, but this risk is much less serious than price risk (Frank, 1992).
Speculators in the market aim to benefit from anticipating price movements. Speculators are
required in the market to provide liquidity, that is to act as buyers and sellers so as to allow
market participants to close out their positions at any point in time. Important as they are, it must
be remembered that the market could perform equally well without speculators if it had sufficient
liquidity. The often-quoted statement that Futures markets transfer risk from hedgers to
speculators is thus not entirely true (Frank, 1992).
Arbitrageurs attempt to make profits by trading between two markets in which prices are
temporarily unsynchronised. The actions of arbitrageurs thus ensure that Futures prices equal spot
prices at contract expiration dates.
When traders take a position, they need not pay the full contract sum but are required to place a
deposit of between 5 and 14 percent of the contract value. This deposit is called "margin money"
and is sufficient to allow the exchange to close out a trader at any time, protecting the integrity
of the market. Traders may be asked to "top up" this margin if price movements are larger than
expected. The result of the small deposit requirement is that a trader or speculator can gain control
over an asset for a small fraction of its underlying value. This high leverage means that the
percentage loss or profit on an investment is usually high. The only other money that changes
hands is the participants' net profit or loss on closing out (Frank, 1992).
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2.3.2 Options trading
Options trading provides producers with an alternative tool with which to manage price risk. A
commodity Futures Option is a contract which conveys to its holder the right, but not the
obligation, to buy or sell an underlying Futures contract in a specific commodity for a fixed
(strike) price at any time prior to the expiration date (CBOE, 1998). This right is guaranteed by
the seller of the option and, in return for shouldering this obligation, he receives a once-off,
non-refundable payment known as a premium (SAFEX, 1998). "Call" Options convey to holders
the right to buy, and "put" Options, the right to sell Futures contracts. The premium which sellers
receive is determined by market forces of supply and demand. Factors known to influence the size
of the premium include (van der Vyver and van Zyl, 1989):
• Price expectations - premiums will be higher if prices (of Futures) are expected
to rise;
• Price stability - higher premiums prevail for commodities whose prices are
volatile;
• Time - the longer the Option is valid for, the higher is the premium;
• Intrinsic value - that amount by which the fixed strike price is less than the current
market price of the Futures contract.
Options can exist in three states (SAFEX, 1998):
• "At-the-money", when the strike price is the same as the current market price;
• "Out-of-the-money", when an Option has no intrinsic value (ie. for a call Option,
when the strike price is above the market price, or vice versa for a put Option);
• "In-the-money", when a call Option has an strike price below the market price of
the underlying asset, or a put Option which has a strike price above the asset price.
A variety of complicated hedging scenarios are available when dealing with Options trading, only
a few, very simple ones will be dealt with here. A maize producer wanting to plant his crop and
who is worried about price risk may buy a call option "at-the-money" on maize Futures. This
effectively guarantees a floor price to the farmer but does not limit his potential benefit from
upward price movements. If the spot price at any stage is higher than the strike price, the Option
is "out-of-the money". The producer should then not exercise his option. In this event losses to
profit potential have been minimised to the level of the premium. If the option is "in-the-money"
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at any time prior to expiration, the seller may exercise his option to buy the underlying maize
future at the strike price and close out his position. This guarantees him the price stipulated in the
Futures contract. Since the Option premium is non-refundable, profits would be fixed and lower
than the equivalent Futures hedging alternative at spot price levels below the strike price.
Producers may also hedge by buying an "out-of-the money" put Option if a price fall is considered
highly unlikely. This Option will have a much lower premium and provides a floor price at a low
level whilst allowing the producer to take greater advantage of possible price rises (van der Vyver
and vanZyl, 1989).
The trading of agricultural commodity Futures began on SAFEX through its Agricultural Markets
Division (AMD) in early 1995. At present, Futures may be traded in both white and yellow maize,
beef and wheat. Trading of both Futures and Options is currently restricted largely to maize and
a large percentage of Futures contracts (roughly 20-30 percent) are not closed-out and result in
delivery. Trading in maize Options has just started and few Options have been traded so far. The
volume of maize traded on SAFEX is increasing but high volumes do not imply high liquidity if
these contracts are traded by a few large market players. There appears to be a relatively small
number of large traders operating on SAFEX. It is speculators who often provide liquidity in
Futures markets, acting as buyers and sellers and allowing hedgers to close out their positions.
In May 1996, SAFEX introduced an electronic, screen-based trading system that has made it one
of the more technologically advanced exchanges in the world. The financial instruments available
through SAFEX provide for a range of risk management strategies from low risk, limited return
Futures hedging to higher risk, higher possible return "out-of-the-money" Options trading. Since
derivatives trading does not necessarily involve physical delivery of product, lower grades of
maize may be hedged with contracts specified in top grades. Maize hedging on the international
Futures markets is also now possible, as is foreign participation in SAFEX. Prices prevailing on
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) have a significant leading effect on the local Futures price.
2.4 Information provision and maize marketing agents
The assets of the previous Maize Board have been taken over by the Maize Trust. The trust funds
an article 21 company which aims to provide information to the industry, the South African Grain
Information Service (SAGIS). This organisation collects information from compulsory returns
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from millers and provides minimum market information such as opening stocks, imports and
exports (Mielies/Maize, 1997b).
The proliferation of market alternatives has resulted in increased marketing choices for many
producers. Trading in many of these marketing channels is often thin and price and other market
information is not visible to other market participants. Price determination can be problematic for
individual market participants. Inappropriate use of the derivatives market may actually increase
producers' exposure to risk. If, for example, a farmer hedged his whole expected production on
the derivatives market, he would still be exposed to risk on any amount by which his actual
production exceeds or falls short of the target. The use of a mix of alternatives could be
beneficial. Much work has been done to determine the optimal hedging ratio for producers. The
optimal percentage of production hedged is dependent on factors such as the decision-maker's
attitude towards risk and the degree of production risk and price risk facing the producer (Bond
and Thompson, 1985; Kahl, 1983). Empirical studies have shown producers' use of derivatives
to usually be below those levels recommended by optimal hedging literature. A number of
marketing agents exist who can advise producers on marketing and provide them with a portfolio
of maize marketing tools.
Since it is now a voluntary association of producers, NAMPO has restructured itself to act as a
maize broker acting on behalf of its members. Another role it hopes to play is that of a
confidential market information source to subscribing members. NAMPO aims to use a variety
of methods to convey this information, such as e-mail, faxes, a phone-in service and a TV
programme (Mielies/Maize, 1997a). SA Feed and Grain Marketing is a company that provides
clients with access to a portfolio of marketing alternatives including Options and Futures trading
via a seat on SAFEX, spot market trading and exports. Cooperatives often help and advise




REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON PRODUCER USE OF MAIZE MARKETING
CHANNELS
Previous research relevant to the topic of this research can broadly be divided into two groups:
studies examining farmers' use of forward pricing methods and studies examining farm-level use
of a range of marketing alternatives. This Chapter summarises the findings of these studies
relevant to the topic of this study.
3.1 Use of forward pricing methods
A number of surveys in the United States of America (US) have investigated farmers' use of
forward pricing methods. One common point mentioned in this research is that, despite the
seriousness of price risk and the overwhelming theoretical evidence that forward-pricing methods
are effective in managing price risk, very few fanners actually use forward pricing and Futures
hedging. Hill (as cited by Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994) surveyed Kansas grain farmers and
found that only four percent of respondents had ever hedged and only 12 percent had ever forward
contracted. Berck (1981) noted that only five percent of farmers surveyed participated in the
Futures market and as many as a third did not know how the derivatives markets could benefit
them. Asplund, Forster and Stout (as cited by Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994) in a 1986 survey
of Ohio farmers found that seven percent had hedged and 42 percent had forward contracted. A
survey of Indiana farmers by Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) revealed that 63 percent had hedged
some of their crop in the previous five years. The average percentage of total acreage hedged per
year was 11.5 percent whilst that forward contracted was 20.5 percent. This indicates a general
trend of increasing producer use of forward-pricing methods by US farmers. The reduction in
government support and liberalisation of produce marketing in the US since 1980 may be partly
responsible for this. It should be noted that producers may often be benefiting from Futures
trading indirectly since many traders and elevators guarantee their cash purchases and forward
contracts by hedging themselves on the Futures market (van der Vyver and van Zyl, 1989). This
may be an important factor reducing farmers' visible use of the derivatives market in South
Africa.
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Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) used the results of a survey of top Indiana maize and soyabean
farmers to identify factors influencing farmers' participation in Futures markets. They treated the
use of Futures as a technology adoption decision. Tobit regression was used to account for both
the discrete adoption decision and the continuous decision as to the proportion of the total crop
to hedge. Farmers' perceptions of the ability of Futures to stabilise incomes was found to be the
most significant factor affecting adoption (+), followed by the farm's debt position (-). Other
significant determinants of adoption included the number of years experience managing a farm
(-), number of years of formal education (+), perceived positive change in income from hedging
(+), self-rating of management ability (+), number of acres farmed (+) and presence of off-farm
income (+). Since the sample size was small (41) and only "top" farmers were interviewed, the
apparently strange result that more experienced farmers hedged less could thus not be
extrapolated to all farmers. Hedging was used less than other risk management strategies. The
authors anticipated problems with the measurement of risk aversion and used three measures of
this variable, none of which were significant in the analysis. Seventy-one percent of respondents
knew of someone who had previously had a bad experience with hedging but this was not found
to significantly affect adoption.
Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) examined farmers' adoption of forward pricing methods. The
focus of this study was on the effectiveness of marketing and risk management seminar~ in
facilitating adoption. Survey data from 509 Kansas producers were compared with their farm
records. Respondents included wheat, corn, sorghum, soybean, cattle and pork producers. The
mix of marketing practices that farmers used was also examined. Cash marketing was found to
dominate the marketing of all the commodities examined. Over 98 percent of producers used the
cash market to some degree (Schroeder and Goodwin, 1994). Differences were discovered
between crops in terms of utilisation of cash marketing, Futures hedging, Options and forward
pricing. Maize and cattle were the two commodities most frequently hedged. Differences were
also seen between crops in terms of the proportion of each crop marketed by a given marketing
channel. Factors significantly affecting forward pricing adoption included (in order of
significance); experience (-), area managed (+), proportion of total land cropped (+), debt/asset
ratio (+), input intensity (+) and seminar attendance (+). Factors affecting marketing seminar
attendance included experience (-), area managed (+), distance to nearest town (-), time spent
reading agricultural literature (+), education (+), proportion of total land cropped (+), debt/asset
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ratio (+) and risk preference (+). A Tobit model (similar to that of Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988)
was used to account for both the discrete adoption decision and the continuous level-of-utilisation
decision.
Makus et al. (1990) studied factors influencing farmers' use of Futures and Options contracts for
a large (595 useable observations) sample of participants in an educational Futures and Options
pilot program covering 22 US states. A Probit model of use of Futures and Options, treated as a
discrete adoption decision found a number of significant determinants of participation at the 1
percent and 5 percent levels of probability; previous use of 'forward contracting arrangements (+),
membership of a marketing club (+), education to or beyond bachelors' degree level (+), farm size
(gross farm sales) (+) and the siting of the farm with respect to region (+,-). Age was not found
to significantly affect adoption at the 5 percent level of probability, but the estimated parameter
for age was negative. This agrees with the findings of Goodwin and Schroeder (1994), and
Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) that experience, a proxy for age, was negatively related to adoption
of Futures and Options hedging.
Turvey (1989) studied the relationship between Futures hedging and the farm financing function.
He noted that hedging with Futures provides farmers with a source of equity capital from the
Futures market as well as increased leverage, since lenders often favour hedgers. Hedging can
also provide producers with a timely source of liquidity. The payoffs from a short hedge are
greatest when prices are low, and this is often when fixed cash obligations are most difficult to
meet. Authors dealing with optimal hedging strategies often focus on business risk (specifically
price risk) without taking into account the financial risk implications of derivatives trading.
Turvey (1989) developed a theoretical optimal hedging model that explicitly takes into account
the farms' capital structure as well as risk aversion. This model hypothesised that hedging activity
increases with indebtedness since the consequences of price variability become more serious and
lenders start to insist on use of hedging instruments before they extend more credit to indebted
farmers. The model predicted that financial risk decreases with hedging, and that hedging
provides liquidity.
Turvey and Baker (1990) investigated the relationships between farm programmes and finance,
and farmers' use of derivatives. They cite government programmes, farm portfolio diversification,
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transaction costs and cash flow restrictions as reasons why use of Futures and Options amongst
farmers is often below that level predicted by optimal hedging literature. The authors emphasise
the stabilising effect that hedging can have on cash flows and the ability of hedging to partially
substitute for other forms of liquidity such as credit reserves. Lenders are also usually more
willing to supply credit to hedgers. Indebted farmers are considered more likely to hedge since
hedging can increase returns and reduce risk. Government price support is expected to reduce the
need for farmers to hedge. An expected-utility maximising model of an Indiana maize-soyabean
farm was used to predict the effects of different levels of risk aversion and debt-to-asset ratios on
the optimal hedging ratio. The results showed that hedging should increase as the debt-to-asset
ratio increases and credit reserves and liquidity decrease in the absence of farm programmes.
Options were the predominant hedging instrument used and can be expected to provide highly
indebted farmers with more liquidity than Futures by minimising losses to profit potential when
prices are increasing. With government support (farm programmes), hedging activity was
reduced.
Berck (1981) derived the demand for cotton Futures in California as a function of the price of a
hedge and the available crop choice set. He noted that use of derivatives may not always be in the
farmers' best interests. Crop diversification was shown to drastically reduce the variance in
income (risk) associated with a given level of income and can be a more appropriate risk
management tool in some cases.
No published South African studies specifically examining the factors influencing producers' use
of the Futures and Options available through SAFEX were found. Such information would be
useful in helping SAFEX to promote their products amongst farmers. The identification of the
characteristics of adopters may help SAFEX focus their promotional efforts on those market
segments that are most likely to use derivatives. Barriers preventing producers' use of SAFEX
could also be identified, allowing appropriate policy recommendations to be made.
3.2 Use of marketing channels
A number of studies have analysed farmers' use of various marketing channels which did not
focus exclusively on derivatives. Turner et al. (1983) examined Georgia producers' attitudes
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towards electronic marketing for a range of commodities. Some 57 percent of respondents
believed electronic marketing had some potential in their businesses. Producers' attitudes were
found to be significantly influenced by their perceptions of the fairness of output prices (-);
intentions to expand their operations (+), age (-) and degree of independent information sourcing
(+) (as opposed to reliance on other farmers for information by less innovative farmers). It should
be noted that this study was conducted before most farmers interviewed had yet had any
experience of electronic marketing.
In their survey of 611 Iowa farmers, Edelman et al. (1990) surveyed the use of four alternative
marketing strategies: forward contracting, Futures, Options and the cash market. In terms of
utilisation of the various marketing channels, grain producers generally preferred forward
contracting and livestock producers Futures hedging as forward pricing methods. A Logit
regression model showed that larger farms were more likely to use forward pricing alternatives
(+). For grain producers, gross sales (+) were significantly related to forward pricing methods, as
were cash sales (-). Crop sales as a percentage of gross sales (+) were significantly related to
forward contracting but significantly (-) related to derivatives hedging. As the percentage of land
rented increased, the use of forward pricing methods increased, with less cash marketing being
utilised. The use of forward pricing methods was significantly related to all three financial
measures included in the model: Cash market use declined as farmers' indebtedness and financial
stress increased and return on assets decreased. The use of one forward pricing method was
significantly positively correlated to use of other forward pricing methods, supporting the findings
of Makus et al. (1990) that previous users of forward contracts are more likely to hedge. Use of
crop insurance was significantly related (-) only to use of Options - these may act as substitutes
for each other as they both limit risk exposure through paid premiums. For fed cattle, factors
found to significantly influence use of Futures included gross sales (+), beef revenues as a
percentage of total gross sales (+), and use of other forward pricing methods (+). Cattle sales as
a percentage of total gross sales (+) and the use of other forward pricing tools (+) significantly
influenced commodity Options use. Gross sales (-) and degree of specialisation (-) were the only
variables significantly influencing use of cash marketing. The survey also examined farmers' use
of marketing information in the form of price information, production cost information and
written marketing plan targets. Use of marketing information was found to be limited. The most
frequently used component was cost of production, the other two categories were used
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infrequently. Attitudinal constraints to marketing were examined, farmers' perceptions of a lack
of integrity in forward pricing markets was found to limit the use of such markets. The next most
limiting perception was that conditions favoured use of other risk-management tools in preference
to the examined marketing alternatives. The point that there are a number of alternatives to
forward pricing which may be more appropriate to certain farmers in certain circumstances is
forcefully made by Berck (1981).
In South Africa, Bunting (1997) interviewed the major role players in the deregulated maize
market. Buyers surveyed sourced an average of 20.7 percent of their supplies by forward contracts
with groups of producers and 10 to 30 percent from cooperatives. Roughly 20 percent of buyers'
supplies came from producers and 2 to 20 percent from other agents. Buyers' use of SAFEX was
limited and that of AGMEX minimal.
Having reviewed previous studies related to farm-level use of marketing alternatives, it is evident
that there is a lack of published South African literature on the topic. Previous international
studies tended to focus on farmers' use of one price risk management tool in isolation of others,
ignoring the fact that different price risk management tools may be substituted for each other.
Many of the factors examined by these previous studies into farmers' use of individual marketing
alternatives may influence use of price risk management tools generally. This study should also
make a valuable addition to the study on electronic grain marketing by Bunting (1997) and




THE POSTAL SURVEY AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
A questionnaire was compiled (see Appendix 1) to measure variables identified by the review of
previous studies in Chapter 3 which were considered relevant to this study. Some important
variables measured by the questionnaire are discussed in more detail in section 6.1. Besides
questions related to the measurement of personal and business characteristics and farmers' use
of various maize marketing alternatives, the questionnaire included additional questions on, for
example, farmers' perceptions of the importance of various risk and information sources. These
were included to allow for comparison of results to similar questions asked in previous surveys
by Woodburn et al. (1995) and Stockil and Ortmann (1998). Additional questions deal with
Internet usage, factors restricting farmers' use of Futures contracts, use of marketing agents,
fanners' information needs and farmers' perceptions as to the competitiveness of the local maize
market.
4.1 The postal survey
A preliminary survey was carried out to ensure that survey questions were clear to farmers and
that key questions had not been omitted. Besides the questionnaire being shown to organisations
such as NAMPO, SAFEX, Stockowners Cooperative and AGMEX, five mixed maize and beef
farmers in the Winterton area of the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands were interviewed personally.
Relevant changes were made to the questionnaire based on these consultations. The questionnaire
was translated into Afrikaans for use in the survey regions, since Afrikaans is the most widely-
spoken language there.
4.1.1 Sample selection
The main aim of this study was to investigate the marketing practices of commercial maize
producers in the predominantly maize-producing areas of South Africa. The commercial maize
farmers of these areas thus constitute the study target population. The 1988 Census of Agriculture
estimated there were a total of 62 427 farming units in South Africa. Of these, 13 544 grew
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predominantly field crops1 (Central Statistical Services, 1988). Maize is consistently planted on
more than 40 percent of South Africa's arable land annually (Directorate: Statistical Information,
1999). The geographical distribution of maize producers in South Africa is not even. The
Northwest Province, Free State and Mpumalanga consistently produce more than 85 percent of
South Africa's total maize production, as shown in Figure 1.1 (Maize Board, 1996). The total
number of commercial farming units in these three provinces is estimated at 25 515 (Central
Statistical Services, 1988). A postal survey of a sample of 800 National Maize Producers'
Organisation (NAMPO) members, drawn from the target population, was administered due to cost
considerations and the large population size (Barnett, 1991).
NAMPO maintains a mailing list of over 7 000 members nationwide. This membership list is
divided into magisterial district and members are assigned to magisterial districts according to
their postal addresses. Average annual maize production has exceeded 100 000 tons in each of
the top 24 magisterial districts. Members in these districts accounted for an average of 61 percent
of total South African commercial maize production over the previous ten years. An index score
was created to quantify average tonnage of maize produced per NAMPO member in each of these
magisterial districts. The ten magisterial districts scoring highest in this index score were drawn
from this list and farmers were sampled randomly, according to the districts' average contribution
to maize production over the previous ten years. The resulting sample is summarised in Table 4.1
and comprised some 301 farmers from the Northwest province, 273 from Mpumalanga and 226
from the Free State.
1 An enterprise was considered dominant if it contributed more that 50 percent of total
farm gross income.
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Source: Le CIus, 1998
* Tonnage of maize produced in each region as estimated by the National Crop Estimates Committee.
Of the 800 questionnaires sent out in June 1998, a total of 107 were returned by the end of
August, yielding an overall response rate of 13.4 percent. Response rates were similar between
regions, ranging from 12.1 percent in Mpumalanga to 15.9 percent in the Free State. Some 26
returned questionnaires were initially deemed unusable because important marketing responses
were incomplete. The relevant questions of 20 of these incomplete questionnaires were mailed
back to respondents who had provided their addresses in an effort to increase the number of
useable responses. Ten of these were returned, leaving the total number of unusable responses at
sixteen. Thus, 91 responses were useable in terms of the maize marketing statistics, giving an 11.4
percent useable response rate, although a 13.4 percent useable response rate (all 107 respondents)
was recorded for certain business and farmer characteristics.
Survey data, such as these, which rely on voluntary provision of information are subject to many
sources of error. Error may arise due to failure to properly recall events, deliberate distortion of
the truth or refusal to participate in the study (Norusis, 1993:167). In addition, if certain
respondents refuse to participate or answer certain questions, further bias will arise. Since the
focus of this study is on maize marketing and the sample is drawn from the main maize-producing
regions of South Africa, the sample is expected to be biased towards large, specialist maize
producers.
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4.2 General characteristics of sample respondents relevant to maize marketing
Farmers' responses to a number of marketing-oriented questions are summarised in this section,
which quantifies the importance producers ascribe to various risk sources and measures the level
of understanding they have of various price risk management tools.
4.2.1 Importance ascribed to various risk sources
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of a number of sources of risk on a Lickert-type
scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). The mean scores attributed to various
sources of risk are compared to those of previous studies of commercial farmers conducted in
KwaZulu-Natal by Stockil (1997) and Woodburn (1993), and to a US study of leading Cornbelt
farmers by Ortmann et al. (1992) in Table 4.2. Maize yield variability was rated the most
important source of risk in this study. This factor was rated second in two previous studies
(Woodburn, 1993; Ortmann etal, 1992). Changes in input costs attained the next highest mean
score, followed by changes in the Rand exchange rate. In contrast to the study by Woodburn
(1993) where it was ranked third, and US studies, where it was consistently ranked first (Ortmann
et al., 1992, Patrick et al, 1985), variability in the maize price was ranked as joint fourth most
important source of risk facing producers in this study. This may reflect farmers' increased
concerns about the effects of further devaluation of the Rand on their input costs, financial
instability, and labour market inflexibility. The actual importance of maize price variability may
be understated as aspects of maize price variability are also captured in other variables such as
variability in the Rand exchange rate, as well as crop yield variability. The apparently low ranking
of maize price variability might even be ascribed to the increased availability of, and farmers'
awareness and use of price risk management tools such as forward pricing since the deregulation
of maize marketing in 1997. If farmers are able to effectively manage price risk, they may be less
concerned about its effects on their business performance.
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Changes in input costs
Variability in the Rand exchange rate
Variability in interest rates
Changes in labour legislation
Maize/crop price variability
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*On Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Rankings appear in superscript. Mean ratings give an
overall rating of the perceived importance of each risk source, due to the ordinal nature of the data.
4.2.2 So urces of marketing information
Respondents spent an average of 3.2 hours per week reviewing maize market information.
Farmers were asked to rate the importance of various sources of maize market information on a
Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (low importance) to 5 (high importance). Results are
summarised in Table 4.3. Weekly agricultural magazines were the most important sources of
maize price information (mean score = 3.707). Publications such as "Farmer's Weekly" have
sections dealing with commodity prices and related news. Specialised, subscription-based
information providers (mean score = 3.677) and SAFEX (mean score = 3.613) were rated the
second and third most important sources of maize price information and these three top-ranked
information sources had very similar scores. SAFEX prices are routinely quoted both in weekly
agricultural magazines and by subscription-based information providers in addition to being
available directly from SAFEX. The importance of SAFEX as an information source is thus
probably understated by these results. Farmers' days were rated as relatively important sources
of marketing information (mean score = 2.943) and these may be useful places for educational
programmes on maize marketing to be focused. The South African Grain Information Service
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(SAGIS) had one of the lowest ratings of usefulness (mean score = 2.435) and many respondents
noted the perceived unreliability of SAGIS information. Other farmers (mean score = 2.707), sales
representatives (mean score = 2.558) and extension officers (mean score = 2.432) were also
generally perceived as unreliable marketing information sources. This is in contrast to
expectations that an informal network of people in rural communities effectively perform price
reporting functions and shows the importance respondents attach to formal information sources.
Table 4.3 Importance attached to various sources of maize market information by sample
maize producers in Northwest Province, Mpumalanga and the Free State (1998)
Source of maize price information
Weekly agricultural magazines

























































*On Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (low importance) to 5 (high importance). Number of respondents is
given in parentheses. Mean ratings give an overall rating of the perceived importance of each information
source, due to the ordinal nature of the data.
When asked to identify their needs for additional information and services for the management
of their maize marketing, the three most commonly requested services were for the provision of
information on trends in international markets (81.6 percent), and more accurate weather forecasts
(80.6 percent) and price forecasts (79.6 percent). This indicates that sample farmers are aware of
the impact of international maize markets on local maize prices since the abolition of the Maize
Board removed maize price, import and export controls. Some 67 percent of respondents
requested more education on Futures and Options trading on SAFEX, and 52 percent saw a need
for the services of marketing agents to arrange their maize marketing.
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4.2.3 Respondents' management skills
When asked to rate the standard of their management relative to other farmers in their districts
on a Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent), sample fanners' mean scores were
lowest for marketing management. This is consistent with the findings of Woodburn (1993) and
Stockil (1997), and indicates a concern amongst farmers that they lack marketing skills. The
percentage of respondents rating their management skills in the range 1-3 for marketing
management (62 percent) was well above those levels for other aspects of management, which
ranged from 29 to 41 percent. Respondents generally rated their skills highest in production
management (mean score=3.83), followed by financial management (mean score = 3.72). Overall
management scored a mean rating of 3.69 and marketing management 3.18 over the sample.
4.2.4 Farmers' understanding and perceptions of various marketing alternatives
Although the majority of respondents considered maize marketing in South Africa to be
competitive, a significant proportion of respondents (43 percent) did not. Respondents who
viewed maize marketing as uncompetitive felt that large buyers were manipulating the maize
price to the detriment of many small producers. The annual turnover of maize trading for 1998
for the Agricultural Marketing Division (AMD) of SAFEX was estimated at R 2.5 billion
(Sturgess, 1999). Much of this trade was due to the hedging activities of large maize buyers and
cooperatives. In comparison, the total gross value of maize production in 1996/97 was only R 4.7
billion. If local maize prices are being manipulated, farmers have a relatively liquid, accessible
hedging alternative in SAFEX to manage price risk. Farmers may also use SAFEX maize Futures
prices to predict future maize spot prices since SAFEX prices reflect all known maize market
information. A recent study by Wiseman (1999) has found SAFEX (AMD) maize futures prices
to reflect future spot prices with increasing accuracy, the implication is that SAFEX (AMD) is
becoming increasingly efficient. Fanners should use SAFEX (AMD) Futures prices as guidelines
in the negotiation of their cash maize sales. Producers should also monitor their local basis (the
difference between the local spot price and the nearby Futures price) to identify opportunities for
transportation or storage of maize.
Farmers' concerns about the competitiveness of the maize market in South Africa may arise from
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their perceived lack of marketing management skills. Three questions in the survey dealt with
farmers' attitudes towards, and understanding of, forward pricing tools. Results in Table 4.4 show
a trend of decreasing understanding of forward pricing tools from the more familiar concept of
forward contracting to the more complex concept of Options trading. Most sample farmers
indicated at least some degree of understanding of the three types of forward pricing examined,
with 99.1 percent, 94.3 percent and 86.8 percent of respondents replying 'well' or 'little' to
questions designed to gauge their understanding of forward contracting, Futures and Options
trading, respectively. Absolute values of these figures are high, indicating some bias in the sample
towards farmers with more knowledge of these marketing alternatives. The differences between
farmers' perceived levels of understanding of forward contracting, Futures hedging and Options
hedging indicate that there is scope for more educational programmes targeting farmers and aimed
at explaining how agricultural commodity Futures and Options contracts can be used as additional
tools to manage price risk.
Table 4.4 Sample producers' understanding and perceptions of forward pricing tools'
(Northwest Province, Mpumalanga and the Free State)
Response
How well do you understand the concept
of forward contracting ?
How well do you understand the concept
of Futures marketing ?
How well do you understand the concept

























* Number of respondents appears in parentheses
Some 44 percent of respondents believed that derivatives trading would increase their average
income, 10 percent disagreed with this statement, and 46 percent were unsure. When asked if they
believed that derivatives trading would reduce product price variability, 50.9 percent of
respondents replied yes, 10.4 percent replied no, and 38.9 percent were undecided. These results
indicate a general positive perception of SAFEX, even though derivatives hedging is aimed at
insuring rather than necessarily increasing farmers' incomes. The relatively high percentage of
undecided answers to the two questions indicates that sample farmers lack understanding of how
the tools available from SAFEX can effectively be used to manage price risk.
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43 Farmers' use of different maize marketing channels
Respondents were asked what percentage of the total value of their annual maize crop was
marketed through, or they anticipated marketing through, the three major markets (cash (spot),
forward contracting and derivatives) in the previous (1997/98), current (1998/99) and forthcoming
(1999/2000) marketing seasons. The relevant intermediaries and buyers involved in the maize
supply chain were also identified. Table 4.5 shows the percentage of respondents using each
marketing alternative (in parentheses) and the mean percentage of the maize crop that was (or is
planned to be) marketed through each alternative for the previous, current and forthcoming
marketing years. The final row of Table 4.5 shows the mean percentage of the maize crop
marketed through the cash (spot), forward contracting and derivatives markets for the sample
farms in each year. Annual figures may sum to over 100 percent due to the fact that maize hedged
on SAFEX is physically sold in other markets. In the first column of Table 4.5, next to the names
of the intermediaries, are the percentages of the total maize crop marketed by that intermediary
each year. Projections for the future marketing plans of producers should be interpreted with care,
since farmers are expected to have flexible marketing strategies and their plans may change if
new, pertinent market information becomes available.
Farmers tended to use a portfolio of maize marketing channels for their crop in preference to
relying on any single channel, indicating their use of sequential and flexible marketing strategies.
Seventy-three percent of respondents utilised more than one marketing channel for their maize
in 1998/99. The mean number of marketing channels used by farmers increased over the period
under review from 3.136 in 1997/98 to 3.219 in 1998/99 and a projected 3.316 in 1999/2000,
showing further diversification of marketing portfolios by sample farmers. Modal numbers of
marketing channels used also increased from two to three over the same period.
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Table 4.5 Use of various marketing channels by sample maize producers for the 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/2000 ' marketing seasons
Intermediaries/buyers
On-farm use (not traded)
Fed on-farm




Commercial users / millers
Large traders
Small agents / traders
SAFEX
Delivered on Futures contracts
Hedged on Futures contracts
• Hedged on Options contracts
Internet marketing
Electronic marketing
Mean percentage of total value of the
crop moving through each market
(excluding on-farm use)
Mean percentage of
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of crop hedged and percentage of
respondents hedging (in parentheses) in
the Derivatives market (SAFEX)2
97/98 98/99 99/00
-
1.1 (5) 2.9 (9) 4.1 (12)
0.0 (0) 2.3 (6) 4.5 (15)
1.1 5.2 8.6
Anticipated.
! Number of respondents (n); 1997/98 = 86; 1998/99 = 84; 1999/2000 = 75.
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The mean percentage of the crop sold in the cash (spot) market declines steadily over the three-
year period due to an increase in on-farm use of maize and forward contracting. The mean
percentage of the crop hedged on SAFEX increases from 1.1 percent in 1997/98 to 5.2 percent
in 1998/99 and to a projected 8.6 percent in 1999/2000. The percentage of sample farmers also
increases over the three-year period. This shows rapid increase in the use of the derivatives
market, considering that similar studies in the USA, where such tools have been available for
over a century, have found hedging rates ranging from five percent (Berck, 1981) to seven
percent in 1986 (Asplund, Foster & Stout: as cited by Goodwin & Schroeder, 1994) and 11.5
percent in 1988 (Shapiro & Brorsen, 1988). The average hedging ratio, defined as ratio of the
individual's hedged position to the cash position (Kahl, 1983), amongst sample SAFEX users
increased from 27 percent in 1997/98 to 49 percent in 1998/99 and an estimated 50 percent in
1999/2000. Recommended hedging ratios for US crop farmers lie in the range of 53 - 75 percent,
depending on individuals' risk preferences (Lapan & Moschini, 1994). In the computation of
these ratios, the assumption was made that Futures hedging was the only price risk management
tool available to farmers. The fact that other price risk management tools such as forward
contracting and sequential marketing may substitute for Futures hedging, may explain why the
hedging ratio was below those levels suggested in optimal hedging literature. Maize yield and
price variability differ between South Africa and the USA. Further research into optimal hedging
ratios appropriate for South African maize farmers would indicate whether local maize farmers
are using hedging to it's full potential and provide useful guidelines to local maize farmers in
their hedging activities.
Figures in the main body of Table 4.5 give the average percentage of the total value of maize
marketed through each channel (users as a percentage of respondents appear in parentheses).
There is an increase in the proportion of maize used on-farm, either as animal feed, or for milling
and further processing. Expressed as a percentage of respondents, the number of on-farm users
remains roughly constant over the three years at about 61 percent for on-farm feeding and 16
percent for on-farm milling. This implies a slight increase in the degree of vertical integration
on farms that are already using some of their own maize, without an increase in the number of
farmers using maize on-farm.
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Elevators (silo operators including cooperatives and former cooperatives) have historically been,
and seem set to remain, the largest intermediaries in the maize market, marketing roughly 50
percent of the value of the maize crop in the study areas. A slight decrease in the value of maize
marketed by elevators is, however, evident with a drop from 52.9 percent of the 1997/98 crop to
an anticipated 50.6 percent of the crop in 1999/2000. Commercial users such as millers directly
buy about 15 percent of sample farmers' maize annually in the study regions. Approximately 60
percent of this requirement is sourced in the forward contract market and the remainder in the
cash (spot) market.
The share of total maize marketed by the large traders (eg. Louis Dreyfus) increases from 7.1
percent in 1997/98 to 8.4 percent in 1998/99 and a projected 8.9 percent in 1999/2000. The
percentage of farmers dealing with large traders also rose from 20 percent in 1997/98 to 25
percent in 1998/99. Large international grain traders are currently expanding their local
operations and setting up regional offices in South Africa (Le Clus, 1998).
Small marketing agents and traders marketed roughly 11 percent of the value of the maize crop
of sample farmers. No respondents reported ever having used the Internet or electronic marketing
for maize trading and it is no surprise that most of these systems are now defunct as they lacked
buyer support and had some serious institutional shortcomings (Bunting, 1997).
In the 1998/99 marketing year, 83 percent of respondents utilised some form of forward pricing
arrangement, be it forward contracting or derivatives hedging. Thus, only 17 percent of
respondents sold their entire crops through the cash market. This may be attributed to the




FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONDENTS' USE OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT
TOOLS
S.I An index of price risk management
Few observations of Futures hedging were recorded (nine percent of cases), whilst only 17
percent of respondents utilised cash (spot) marketing exclusively, the remainder used a portfolio
of marketing alternatives. Previous studies have focused purely on the forward-pricing aspects
of price risk management and ignored farmers' use of flexible and sequential marketing
strategies. Due to the low number of observations of both hedging and exclusive cash (spot)
marketing activities and a wish to measure other aspects of price risk management behaviour, a
continuous index of price risk management was composed. This is in contrast to previous studies
where discrete adoption of derivatives use, and proportions of crop hedged were used as
dependent variables (Makus et ah, 1990; Shapiro & Brorsen, 1988; Goodwin & Schroeder,
1994). An index was thus created to measure the degree to which respondents made use of price
risk management tools and to serve as the dependent variable in a regression model. The index




Where: za, = The standardised proportions of the i th farmer's crop marketed
through cash (spot) market channels, plus a constant term (5).
zP, = The standardised proportions of the i th farmer's crop protected
by forward, Futures and Options contracting mechanisms, plus a
constant term (5).
ns+nf = n = The total number of cash (spot) (ns) and Forward-pricing (nf)
marketing channels used by the i th farmer.
zD = The standardised value of a dummy variable scoring 0 for cash
market and 1 otherwise, plus a constant term (5).
zUj = The standardised value of the total number of marketing channels
used by the i th respondent, plus a constant term (5).
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The computed values of this index were then standardised so that the final index was derived as:
The index Jj is an index of price risk management for the i th farmer. It takes into account three
aspects of price risk management behaviour exhibited by sample respondents: the use of forward
pricing mechanisms (using a dummy variable), the number of different marketing channels used,
and the relative proportions of the producer's crop passing through each channel. Higher index
scores imply greater use of price risk management tools such as forward pricing and sequential
marketing. Due to the standardisation procedure, the scale effects of the different units of
measure of the index components on the resultant index are eliminated. The constant added to
each standardised variable (5) simply ensures that all values used in the construction of the index
are positive. The index accounts for three aspects of price risk management behaviour without
applying subjective weightings to the different components.
Computed values of J, for the 1998/99 marketing season lie in the range - 1.21 to 3.56 and bad
a mean value of 0.00. Thirty-two of the 80 respondents recorded index values above the rm-an
(higher-level users of price risk management tools) and 48 below the mean (lower-level users of
price risk management tools).
5.2 Higher- versus lower-level users of price risk management
Having reviewed respondents' marketing arrangements, this section considers the business and
personal characteristics of the respondents measured in the survey instrument, and how they
differ between higher- and lower-level users of price risk management tools, as defined by the
index developed in section 5.1. A table summarising the differences between the two groups is
presented in Appendix 2.
5.2.1 Personal characteristics of respondents
Table 5.1 shows that the mean age of respondents did not differ significantly between the groups
at the 10 percent level, but was lower amongst higher-level users than lower-level users. This
concurs with a priori expectations that younger farmers would be more likely to use forward
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pricing tools and be quicker to adopt such methods. As expected, more experienced farmers, who
were used to the previous controlled maize marketing environment, were less likely to adopt
newer marketing techniques such as hedging and forward contracting. A similar negative
relationship between years of experience and adoption of forward pricing mechanisms was
reported by Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) and Makus et al.
(1990). Experience may thus be used as a proxy for age. Higher-level users of price risk
management tools had more years of formal education (mean = 15 years) than lower-level users
(mean = 13 years). These differences were also statistically significant for the respondents'
spouses who are often involved in marketing management decisions. This may be partly a
reflection of the small differences in mean respondent age between the two groups, but also
supports a priori expectations and previous studies (Makus et al, 1990; Goodwin & Schroeder,
1994; Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988,) which found that more educated farmers have lower
transaction costs of adopting relatively more complicated forward pricing strategies.
























*** Denotes significant difference between mean values for higher- and lower-level users of
price risk management tools at the 1 percent level of probability.
5.2.2 Characteristics of the sample maize farm businesses
5.2.2.1 Farm business ownership structure
Overall, 71 respondents (66.4 percent) described their farms as individual ownerships, which was
the predominant form of business structure amongst both lower- and higher-level users of price
risk management tools. However, higher-level users tended to have more alternative forms of
business structure to individual ownership, such as companies, close corporations and trusts (only
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59 percent indicated individual ownership) compared to lower-level users, 71 percent of whom
reported individual ownerships. The negative relationship between individual ownership and
degree of use of forward pricing may be due to co-variance between farm size and ownership
structure. Larger farms, which are postulated to be more likely to use forward pricing
mechanisms as fixed transaction and information costs and scale-dependent benefits can be
spread over a larger volume of output, are also less likely to be individually owned.
5.2.2.2 Farm sizes and enterprise mixes
The survey included both physical (area and animal measures) and financial (annual turnover)
measures of farm size. Enterprise mixes were similarly measured with physical and financial
breakdowns. The mean size of sample farms was 2 480 ha, of which 1105 ha was arable, and
average annual turnover was R 2 699 301.The average size of farms differed significantly
between lower and higher-level users of price risk management tools for the 1998/99 marketing
season. Table 5.2 shows that higher-level users had significantly larger farm sizes (at the 10
percent level of probability) than lower-level users, both in terms of total area and total arable
area. Mean annual turnover for higher-level users was much higher than that of lower-level users
(mean difference was statistically significant at the 5 percent level of probability). This confirms
a priori expectations that larger farms are more likely to use price risk management mechanisms,
especially forward pricing mechanisms, than smaller farms, since they are able to spread both the
fixed information and transaction costs and scale-dependent returns of using such mechanisms
over a larger volume of output than are smaller farms.
Table 5.2 Comparison between mean farm size measures of lower and higher-level users



















* Denotes significant difference between mean values at 10 percent level of probability
** Denotes significant difference between mean values at 5 percent level of probability
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Details on the most common enterprises of the sample farms by region are given in Table 5.3.
All respondents grew maize, with higher-level users of forward pricing having significantly larger
hectarages of white maize on average. However, these differences are not reflected in the mean
proportional contributions of either white or yellow maize to gross farm income. This implies
that the differences in proportional turnover contributions of maize are due to a farm size effect,
rather than to differences in the intensiveness of maize production between lower and higher-
level users. Proportional contributions to turnover made by off-farm income did not differ
between lower and higher-level users of price-risk management mechanisms, in contrast to the
results reported by Goodwin and Schroeder (1994). The low number of respondents for most
other enterprises makes it difficult to compare means between user groups on a valid basis.




























































' Only those enterprises reported by over 10 respondents (in total) are included in this table
* Mean values stated as percentage contribution to gross income on the farms on which that
enterprise occurs. Number of respondents reporting each enterprise is given in parentheses
*** Denotes significant differences between mean values at the I percent level of probability
The degree of enterprise diversification affects the overall risk of farmers" enterprise and asset
investments, and is thus an important factor influencing marketing decisions. An inverse index
of diversification (Nieuwoudt, 1984) was estimated by the sum of each enterprise's squared
proportional contributions to turnover for each farm. An index value of one implies complete
specialisation in one enterprise, whilst that approaching zero implies high diversification. The
scale is not linear. The mean score for this index was 0.44 across both user groups.
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5.2.2.3 Financial characteristics of farms
At the time of this study, South Africa was experiencing a period of financial instability, with
interest rates being held relatively high (upwards of 22 percent) in an attempt to reverse a decline
in the value of the Rand. The Reserve Bank base rate was 17 percent in July 1998 and the
predominant rate on fixed-rate installment sales agreements from commercial banks averaged
22.62 percent for that month (South African Reserve Bank, 1998). The Rand/US $ exchange rate
rose from an average of R 4.94/$ in January 1998 to average R 6.24/$ in July 1998, constituting
a devaluation of more than 25 percent. Higher nominal interest rates were likely to create
financial stress for those sample farmers with relatively high short-term debt commitments. The
mean value of farming assets (as at 28 February 1998) amongst higher-level users of forward
pricing tools was significantly higher (R 7.62 million) than that amongst lower-level users (R
3.89 million). Similar significant differences were found in debt levels, with mean total debt
among higher-level users being R 2.1 million compared to R 1.0 million among lower-level
users. These differences probably reflect differences in farm size between the two groups, as
shown by the analysis of farm debt:asset ratios below.
The debt:asset ratio is a useful measure of farm solvency. As this ratio increases, pressure on
farm cash flows increases, as debt rises relative to assets. Most respondents (over 86 percent) had
debt:asset ratios below the 0.5 threshold that is generally considered 'safe' (Barry et al, 1995).
However, with prime interest rates on bank overdraft at the time of this study exceeding 22
percent, and assuming a 5.1 percent real rate of return on the value of farm land which is the
maize farmers' major asset (Nieuwoudt, 1980), farms with debt:asset ratios exceeding 0.23
would become susceptible to cash flow problems. Only 42.9 percent of respondents' debt:asset
ratios were below this level, implying that many sample farms were likely to be under some
degree of financial stress at the time of the study, unless they had access to outside capital. This
would be expected to have a large impact on their marketing strategies. No statistically
significant difference was found between the mean debt:asset ratio values for lower (0.32) and
higher-level (0.29) users of price risk management tools. This implies that the differences
existing in mean asset values and mean debt levels between user groups are a reflection of
differences in farm size between the two groups and not relative degrees of financial stress.
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5.2.2.4 Communication infrastructures, adoption of personal computers and Internet
use
Seventy-five respondents (72.1 percent) reported owning a personal computer for use in the farm
business. This figure indicates a general increase in computer adoption from previous South
African studies investigating the use of computers in farming. Woodburn (1993) found a
computer adoption rate of 48 percent amongst a sample of commercial farmers in Natal, while
Stockil (1997) reported an increase in the adoption rate to 64 percent for a similar sample of
farmers some three years later. The computer adoption rate differed between groups, generally
being higher amongst higher-level users of price risk management tools (81 percent) than
amongst lower-level users (69 percent). Woodburn (1993) found operator's age to be negatively
related to computer adoption, and both Woodburn (1993) and Stockil (1997) found a positive
relationship between farm size (gross turnover) and computer adoption. As expected and reported
earlier, higher-level users had larger mean turnover levels than lower-level users, but they tended
to be of similar age (46 years versus 47 years respectively). Lower-level users also have a slightly
larger number of years farming experience (25 years) than higher-level users (23 years).
Of the 75 percent of respondents who owned a computer for use on the farm, 38 percent had
Internet access. Amongst lower-level users of price risk management, 35 percent of computer
owners had Internet access, whilst amongst higher-level users this figure was considerably
higher, at 46 percent. The Internet was most commonly used for personal e-mail correspondence
(82 percent), and to access maize price (79 percent) and management (68 percent) information
which is available over the Internet from subscription-based services such as Agrimark Trends.
Internet banking for personal (53 percent) and business (50 percent) uses was the next most used
Internet application. Some 46 percent of respondents used e-mail for business correspondence.
Access to computers and sufficient communication infrastructure is a prerequisite for Internet
adoption. A reliable communication infrastructure is also needed to effectively manage
derivatives trading. Of the 107 respondents, 15 percent had party-line telephones, 82.5 percent
had direct telephone lines, 80.0 percent had cellular phones and 63.8 percent had fax facilities.
Comparisons between lower-level and higher-level users of price risk management tools in Table
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5.4 show little evidence to suggest that higher-level users had access to more advanced
communication infrastructure.
Table 5.4 Comparison of communication infrastructures between lower and higher-level
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5.2.2.5 Storage of maize
Use of maize storage facilities is expected to affect respondents' marketing strategies. The use
of some price risk management tools such as sequential marketing often requires that maize be
stored prior to sale. Eighty-eight percent of higher-level users of price risk management tools
reported making use of commercial silos for maize storage, as opposed to 60 percent of lower-
level users (difference significant at the 5 percent level of probability). Nineteen percent of
higher-level users had on-farm storage facilities for maize; on average, these were sufficient to
store 11 percent of their annual production. Only eight percent of lower-level users had such




Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to examine relationships between relevant
explanatory variables and the index of price risk management score (dependent variable). Probit
and Tobit models were used by Goodwin and Schroeder (1994), Makus et al. (1990) and Shapiro
and Brorsen (1988), who all examined US grain farmers' use of forward pricing, treating it as
a technology adoption decision using proportions of crop hedged as dependent variables.
Edelman et al. (1990) used logistic regression to model the discrete (0/1/2) adoption of cash
marketing, forward contract marketing, Futures hedging and Options hedging by US grain
producers. The OLS method is preferred for the analysis of local price risk management tools
because the Jj index score is continuous.
6.1 Variables hypothesised to affect respondents' use of price risk management tools
Adapting economic theory on technology adoption, and the US studies previously outlined in
Chapter 3, the following factors are postulated to affect sample South African maize farmers'
adoption and degree of use of price risk management tools:
• Farm size is expected to be positively related to the use of both forward contracting and
derivatives. The scale-dependent potential gains of price risk management tools increase,
and fixed (information and transaction) costs associated with their use can be spread over
a larger volume of output, as farm size increases. The 'lumpy' nature of some marketing
contracts due to specified unit contract and order volumes, also favours larger producers.
The size of the maize enterprise is particularly important, and various measures of farm
size were considered, including turnover (Rands) and area (hectare) indicators.
• Education is expected to have a positive effect on the adoption of price risk management
tools. More educated farmers would probably have lower transaction costs associated
with adopting the "new technology" of more complicated marketing tools. It should take
less time and effort for more educated individuals to better understand and use such tools.
Education was measured by the respondents' number of years of formal education (eg.
12 years represents matric level, and 15 years a three-year degree or diploma).
• Financially stressed farmers would more likely use price risk management tools due to
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their being relatively less able to bear risk. Hedging can be a source of liquidity and
lenders are expected to favour those who 'lock-in' forward prices (Turvey, 1989).
Relative indebtedness among respondents was proxied by comparing sample farmers'
debt:asset ratios.
Farming experience is expected to have a negative effect on the adoption of price risk
management tools. More experienced farmers, who were used to the previous regulated
maize marketing environment, may be slower to adopt novel marketing techniques such
as hedging. Previous studies in the US (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994; Shapiro and
Brorsen, 1988) found that experience was negatively related to commercial grain fanners'
use of derivatives. The experience variable is likely to be positively correlated to farmers'
age and can be used as a proxy for fanner's age. Experience was measured as the number
of years of employment on a farm since the age of 18.
Risk aversion should positively influence the use of price risk management tools, ceteris
paribus. In reality, all other things are not equal. Economic theory recognises two forms
of risk facing farmers: financial risk is incurred due to the fixed, contractual obligations
associated with debt financing, while business risk is incurred independently of the way
the business is financed and includes price and yield variability (Barry et al., 1995).
Forward pricing tools can be used to manage price risk which is an important source of
business risk. However, there are many other business and financial risks that comprise
the total risk facing the fanner. There are a variety of alternative methods which may
substitute for, or complement forward pricing tools in managing risk. Measurement of
risk aversion per se is difficult because farmers' use of alternative risk management
measures will affect their exposure to risk and thus their attitude towards it.
Consequently, few studies have found any measure of risk aversion to be significantly
related to forward pricing use (Edelman etal, 1990; Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Makus
et al, 1990; Turner et al, 1983). Goodwin and Schroeder (1994:943) report, contrary to
their expectations, that 'respondents with a stated preference for risk were more likely to
adopt forward pricing than risk averse producers'. This suggested that commercial US
grain farmers viewed forward pricing as riskier than other marketing techniques. The
findings of optimal hedging literature that optimal hedging ratios are less than one
implies that 'forward pricing reduces income risk at low levels, but increases risk as the
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proportion forward priced increases' (Musser et al. (1996:66). This evidence, and the
popularity of sequential and flexible marketing strategies with producers (Patrick et al.,
1980; King & Lybecker, 1983) -which implies that a combination of cash and forward
pricing reduces income risk - led Musser et al. (1996) to conclude that the effect of the
full range of forward pricing on risk reduction is unclear. A self-rating of risk aversion
relative to other farmers in the region was included in an attempt to measure risk aversion
in this study. The range of alternative risk management tools discussed below were
analysed as separate explanatory variables:
* Enterprise diversification should be negatively related to the use of price risk
management tools as it is a means to reduce risk, and so may be a substitute for
price risk management. Diversification was measured by an index composed of
the sum of the squared proportional contributions of each individual enterprise
on the farm to total income. This index ranged in value from 0 (highly
diversified) to 1 (completely specialised in one enterprise), so that a positive sign
on this variable would indicate a risk management substitution effect.
• The proportion of total income derived from maize is expected to be positively
related to sample farmers' use of price risk management tools. The more reliant
the farm business is on maize for it's income, the more likely it will be for any
risk averse producer to use maize price risk management tools.
• Crop insurance . The use of crop insurance implies that the respondent is averse
to yield risk and thus should be more likely to use price risk management tools
to insure his income. Crop insurance is complementary to the use of many price
risk management tools which require the physical delivery of maize.
• Maize storage facilities, either on-farm or at a cooperative/elevator company,
allow producers to store crops to take advantage of seasonal price movements.
Producers using these alternatives would be more exposed to price risk and thus
more likely to use price risk management tools. Respondents' use of maize
storage facilities, either on or off-farm, was measured by a dummy variable
(l=use, 0= no use).
* The proportion of farm land rented reflects arrangements that may incur fixed
annual rental charges which must be met regardless of yields and prices (except
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for share-cropping arrangements). Producers who incur these costs may be more
likely to use price risk management tools to guard against price risk which may
reduce their ability to meet these fixed charges.
Marketing management rating is expected to negatively influence use of price risk
management tools. Respondents who lack confidence in their own marketing skills may
be more likely to utilise brokers and marketing agents. These agents and brokers may be
more likely to use forward pricing tools to ensure prices prior to delivery. A self-rating
of management skills relative to other farmers was included to measure the respondents'
level of confidence in various areas of management.
Producers' perceptions of the usefulness of price risk management tools will probably
affect the degree to which they adopt these tools. The following measures of producer
attitudes were considered in the model as dummy variables (l=agree, O=otherwise):
• Expected income effects - Producers who believe their expected income will be
increased by forward-pricing (1) are more likely to hedge and forward contract.
• Price stability effects - Producers who perceive that forward-pricing will stabilise
prices (1) are more likely to use forward pricing tools.
• Free market preferences - Producers in favour of the freer marketing of
agricultural produce (1) are expected to be more likely to use more novel
marketing channels.
• Bad experiences - Farmers who have had, or know someone who has had, a bad
experience (1) with a particular marketing alternative may be less likely to use
that alternative.
• Off-farm income (1) may have a positive or negative effect on the use of price risk
management tools. The higher the level of off-farm income, the less dependent
the farmer will be on farm income. Price risk might thus not concern him as much
as it would a farmer without off-farm income. Conversely, a farmer with
significant off-farm income might be more acquainted with business and financial
matters and be more likely to use price risk management tools.
Time spent reading publications of an agricultural or financial nature is expected to
positively influence use of price risk management tools. Producers who spend relatively
more reading these sources may be more likely to be "early-adopters" due to the
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additional insight and knowledge gained. The average number of hours spent reading
agricultural and financial publications was used as the proxy for this variable.
Communication infrastructure would directly influence the ability to use certain
marketing channels. Farmers with access to reliable communications/media are more able
to monitor and manage price risk management tools. An inverse index of
communications infrastructure was created to measure this variable, this index was
created in a similar manner to the enterprise diversification index mentioned earlier.
Market information. The importance which producers attach to market information, and
how they source this information, are expected to influence their use of price risk
management tools. Those who use subscription-based information sources are expected
to be more concerned about price risk and more able to make informed decisions. Sample
farmers' ratings of various information sources were considered in the model.
Regional effects on the use of price risk management were considered. Two dummy
variables were used to define the three regions.
6.2 Regression model results
Table 6.1 shows the model estimated after the elimination of variables with statistically
insignificant t statistics. The R2 statistic of the model was 35.7 percent, while the adjusted R2 was
29.6 percent. This implies that 35.7 percent of the variation in the price risk management index
score was accounted for by the explanatory variables included in the model. The adjusted R2
statistic takes account of distortions in the data which can be caused by the loss of degrees of
freedom accompanying the addition of more explanatory variables and is considered more
reliable than R2 (Mirer, 1983).
6.2.1 Goodness of fit
The F statistic of the regression model was highly significant (sig. F = 0.0001) and all t-statistics
were significant at least at the 10 percent level of probability. The adjusted R2 statistic of 29.6
percent is relatively low, but as Gujarati (1988:186) notes, "it does not mean the model is
necessarily bad". Measures of goodness of fit must be viewed in the context of previous US
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studies. Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) achieved a 72 percent correct classification of users in
their Probit model of adoption of forward pricing methods. Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) achieved
an equivalent R2 statistic of 84 percent in their Tobit model of Futures hedging adoption, whilst
Makus et al. (1990) correctly predicted 71.8 percent of cases in their Probit model. Goodness of
fit, as measured by percentage correct classification, is not directly comparable to R2 measures
and Logit models with correct classification percentages as high as 92 percent may have R2
equivalents as low as 24.2 percent (Stockil, 1997). This model correctly classified 72 percent of
'higher-level users' of price risk management tools (farmers with marketing index scores above
the sample mean) and 69 percent of 'lower-level users'. Overall, 70 percent of cases were
correctly classified. Edelman et al. (1990) achieved model R statistics (analogous to R2 in OLS)
ranging from 18.9 percent to a maximum of 26.4 percent in four logistic regression models of
discrete adoption of cash, forward contract, Futures-hedged and Options-hedged marketing
alternatives for Iowa grain farmers.
One reason for the low adjusted R2 statistic in the South African study may be that there was little
variation in the data since the sample was biased towards large, specialist maize farmers who
face similar price situations and marketing decisions. The index may also understate the use of
risk price management tools because of the major marketing role played by cooperatives to whom
farmers may sell maize knowing that prices are guaranteed by the cooperative's use of price risk
management tools. The marketing of maize in South Africa has only recently been liberalised,
whereas many of the price risk management tools measured in the index have been available to
US farmers for over a century. This may have contributed to a large random component in the
adoption of price risk management tools, due to the actions of local sample producers still
experimenting with the new marketing alternatives available to them. The relatively small sample
size (n=84) may have further enhanced this random component. Similar low measures of
goodness of fit were obtained by Makus et al. (1990) for a Tobit model of adoption of forward
pricing for corn and soyabeans in a sample of large-scale Midwestern US farmers. This was
attributed to "a large random component (effect) on forward pricing, or some non-economic
explanation" (Makus et al, 1990:76). A referee of that study suggested that an alternative non-
economic explanation may be that "some farmers use forward pricing because it makes them feel
good".
55
Table 6.1 Summary ofOLS Regression Results.
Variable name Variable definition b SE(b) t Sig t
STORAGE Respondent uses maize storage facilities (1) or not (0)
OFEMP Respondent has off-farm employment (1) or not (0)
INSURE Respondent covered by formal crop insurance (1) or not (0)
EDUCATION Respondent's number of years of formal education
LNMAIZE Natural logarithm of the proportion of annual turnover arising from maize (both
yellow and white)




Adjusted R2 Statistic 0.296
Standard Error 0.870
F Statistic 5.831






























Specification error may also have played a role in reducing the R2. Although all those variables
included in previously discussed models were considered in this model, some variables
particularly relevant to South African maize marketing may have been excluded. The dominant
role still being played by cooperatives (and former cooperatives now operating as public
companies) in local maize marketing may be masking direct producer use of price risk
management tools. The lack of a reliable explicit measure of risk aversion, and the risk-balancing
behaviour that producers are expected to employ, may also have created specification error.
These aspects could be considered in future research work related to this topic.
6.2.2 Variables included in the model
Some inferences drawn from the theory outlined in section 4.1 and the variables included in the
estimated regression model presented in Table 6.1 are considered below.
STORAGE
STORAGE is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent used maize storage
facilities, either on-farm or at commercial silos. The positive regression coefficient implies that
the use of some price risk management tools, such as forward contracting and sequential
marketing, is complementary with storage activities. Farmers who are both physically and
financially able to utilize maize storage facilities both on or off the farm may have a longer
planning horizon for maize marketing. They may be aiming to benefit from seasonal trends in
the maize price associated with the one-time supply shock and steady spread of demand over time
that characterise the South African maize market. Storing maize for any length of time exposes
the maize inventory to increased price risk and is thus likely to increase the need to use price risk
management tools. If the storer is aiming to benefit from anticipated positive price movements,
hedging on Futures markets would obviously not be appropriate since prices will be more or less
'locked-in' apart from unexpected changes in the basis. However, sequential marketing strategies
and Options hedging may be used as they can capture potential benefits from positive price
movements, and it is likely that these are the components of the index of price risk management
affected by storage activities.
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OFEMP
A priori expectations as to the effect of off-farm employment on farmers' use of maize marketing
alternatives were unclear. On the one hand, employment off the farm provides an additional,
often reliable source of income to respondents, reducing the seriousness of the effects of price
risk on farmers, and reducing use of price risk management tools. On the other hand, farmers
with off-farm employment may be more acquainted with business and financial matters and be
more likely to use these tools. Access to such tools may also be easier for farmers with off-farm
employment. Given that the sample is biased towards larger, specialist maize farms, the income
provided by off-farm employment was probably small compared to the possible variation in
income brought about by variations in the maize price. The second effect would thus outweigh
the first, which is borne out by the positive sign on the regression coefficient.
INSURE
The positive coefficient of INSURE, a dummy variable indicating respondents' use (or
otherwise) of crop insurance, was statistically significant at the 1 percent level of probability. The
use of crop (production) insurance - mainly in the form of hail insurance - indicates risk averse
behaviour with regard to income risk, which comprises both production and price risk.
Respondents using crop insurance may then be considered more likely to also use price risk
management tools. Crop insurance could theoretically substitute for price risk management tools,
resulting in a negative relationship between crop insurance and the use of these tools. However,
the use of forward pricing tools often requires that physical delivery be ensured (to some degree)
and crop insurance would then complement the use of price risk management tools.
EDUCATION
Respondents' number of years of formal education (EDUCATION) was positively related to use
of price risk management tools. This supports a priori expectations and previous studies in the
US (Goodwin & Schroeder, 1994; Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Makus et al, 1990;.More
educated farmers probably have lower transaction costs associated with the adoption of relatively



















Table 6.2 shows that the EDUCATION variable is negatively correlated with respondents' age
and experience. Younger farmers would be expected to have relatively more years of formal
education. Age was expected to be negatively related to respondents' use of price risk
management tools and so the age component of EDUCATION would enhance it's positive effect
on the use of price risk management tools. Younger, less experienced, more educated respondents
who tend to make more use of these tools may also tend to be less established farmers who are
more susceptible to price risk and thus have more need to manage price risk. Various
(exponential, cubic and quadratic) transformations of EDUCATION were tested in the study as
it was thought that use of price risk management tools should increase with the respondents'
number of years of formal education at an increasing rate - the best fit, however, was linear.
LNMAIZE
The natural logarithm of the percentage contribution of maize to gross income, LNMAIZE, was
positively related to the use of price risk management tools. Specialised maize farmers are more
prone to maize price risk than farmers with a more diversified enterprise mix and would be more
likely to utilise, and devote more time to, maize price risk management tools. The LNMAIZE
measure may capture aspects of farm size as well; the focus of the sample is biased towards large,
specialised maize farms, thus specialist maize producers in the sample regions are more likely
to have larger farm sizes. Both the scale-dependent benefits and fixed transaction costs associated
with the use of certain price risk management tools may be spread over a larger amount of output
as the volume of maize marketed increases. The 'lumpy' nature of contracts (minimum volume
specifications) associated with Futures and Options hedging excludes farmers who market only
small volumes of maize. The larger the proportional contribution of maize to gross income, the
larger the volume of maize likely to be marketed by the producer and the more likely that he will
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use price risk management tools. The logarithmic transformation implies that the use of maize
price risk management tools increases at a decreasing rate as the maize share of gross income
increases. Decreasing returns to size may be experienced by larger-volume maize producers or
management marketing time may be limited for very large producers.
MKTGM
MKTGM represents respondents' self-rating of marketing management ability relative to other
farmers in their district, measured on a Lickert-type scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). This
variable was negatively related to J;, and the estimated coefficient was statistically significant at
the 10 percent level of probability. A priori expectations were that MKTGM would measure
respondents' level of confidence in the use of price risk management tools and would thus be
positively related to J,. Hov/ever, respondents who rated their marketing management skills
highly were less likely to use price risk management tools. The explanation may be that those
rating their marketing skills highly have less need for Futures as they are inherently better able
to manage spot price risk via other marketing methods. In addition, such farmers may be using
price risk management tools indirectly via intermediaries such as cooperatives which may
guarantee spot prices to farmers by using price risk management tools such as hedging.
Respondents generally rated their skills in marketing management lowest compared to other
aspects of management such as production and financial management, indicating concern about
their inadequate marketing skills.
6.3 Comparison of Results with Previous Studies.
Table 6.3 compares the results of this study with those of previous US studies. The sample size
(n=84) was small compared to those used by Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) and Makus et al.
(1990), but larger than that of Shapiro and Brorsen (1988). Although the focus of, and the
statistical methods employed in this study differed from those of previous studies, the models
share a number of similar variables.
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Use of maize storage facilities +
Self-rating of marketing
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adoption of forward pricing
methods
Kansas corn, wheat, soyabean cattle
and pork producers
Tobit regression
Years of farming experience
Percent of land cropped +
Debt/asset ratio +
Input intensity +
Marketing seminar attendance +
Makus et at.
(1990, n=595)
Factors influencing producers' use
of Futures and Options contracts
Participants of a pilot program
covering 22 US states
Probit regression
Previous use of forward +
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Turnover (farm size) +
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Measures of enterprise size were included in all four models. This study used the proportion of
turnover arising from maize, which is related to size (correlation coefficient between proportion
of turnover arising from maize and gross income = 0.277). Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) used area
farmed. Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) used percentage of land cropped and Makus et al. (1990)
used gross income as size measures. In all cases, size was positively related to the dependent
variable.
This study and the Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) study both found that off-farm
employment/income had a positive affect on farmers' use of price risk management tools/Futures
hedging. The two studies, however, differed in their estimation of the effect of self-rated
marketing management ability on the respective dependent variables. Shapiro and Brorsen (1988)
found a positive relationship and interpreted the rating as one of self-confidence in management
ability. This study found a negative relationship, with the rating interpreted as an inverse measure
of ability to handle price risk. These differences in the interpretation of this variable may be
justified on the basis that South African maize producers have only carried full responsibility for
the marketing of their crop since 1997, whilst US producers have long had access to price risk
management tools.
In common with Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), this study found that use of price risk management
tools/Futures was positively related to producers' level of education. The negative relationship
between the dependent variable and years of farming experience was supported by Shapiro and
Brorsen (1988) and by Makus et al. (1990). Both the education and experience variables are
expected to be influenced by operators' age (all three variables were highly correlated).
The primary objective of using forward pricing methods is to manage price risk. Previous studies
reviewed did not explicitly account for risk aversion although some aspects of risk aversion are
incorporated in other variables (Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994). One
measure of risk aversion incorporated in this model was the presence or absence of formal crop
insurance. It was difficult to isolate absolute price risk aversion due to the risk-balancing
behaviour of producers. INSURE may be considered a rather poor measure of risk aversion and
future studies should carefully consider ways to objectively measure price risk aversion and
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account for risk-balancing effects.
Certain factors that significantly influenced adoption of various forward pricing tools in previous
studies did not significantly influence the use of price risk management tools in this model.
Shapiro and Brorsen (1988) reported that positive perceptions about the effectiveness of hedging
had a positive influence on the adoption of hedging. Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) identified
marketing seminar attendance and input intensiveness as further factors positively related to use
of forward pricing. Makus etal. (1990) found siting of the farm with respect to region, marketing
club membership and previous use of forward contracts to further influence hedging activity in
addition to farm size and operator's age. Use of maize storage facilities was the only variable in
the local model that did not occur in any of the previous US models. This again emphasises the
strong role still played by elevators (cooperatives and former cooperatives) in SA maize
marketing.
CONCLUSIONS
Maize is a key agricultural commodity in South Africa, both as the staple diet of many South
Africans, and as an animal feed. The maize price is volatile, driven mainly by the price-inelastic
nature of maize demand, and large, climatically-induced shifts in maize supply. The limits on
maize price fluctuations imposed by net import and export parity are wide because major maize
markets are far from South Africa and transport costs are high. Price risk in unregulated maize
marketing has long been of concern to maize producers, and price volatility led to government
intervention in maize marketing in the 1930's. The Maize Board's single-channel marketing
strategy came at a high net cost to society. The passing of the Marketing of Agricultural Products
Act in October 1996 led to the dissolution of the Maize Board, with the result that maize
marketing in South Africa is now almost completely free of government price support.
Maize spot (cash) prices now fluctuate, vary between localities and are difficult to monitor since
individual transactions are not observed by other market participants. Maize farmers now face
considerable price risk. Farmers may manage price variability using a variety of price risk
management tools, ranging from sequential marketing, to forward contracting to hedging with
Futures and Options. The use of these price risk management tools cannot be considered in
isolation, since they may be substitutes for one another.
Most sample farmers used a portfolio of different maize price risk management tools. Further
diversification of this marketing portfolio is foreseen, as farmers have tended to, and intend to
use, more maize marketing channels, reflecting increased use of sequential marketing strategies
to manage price risk. The percentage of the maize crop forward-contracted and used on-farm is
increasing, at the expense of using the spot market in the study areas. Direct maize farmer
participation in derivatives trading on SAFEX has increased markedly from 1.1 percent of the
value of study farmers' maize in 1997/98 to 5.2 percent in 1998/99 and an intended 8.6 percent
in 1999/2000. This is a high level of producer utilisation of derivatives when it is considered that
hedging rates found in US studies, where these tools have been available for over a century
increased from roughly 6 percent in 1986 to 11.5 percent in 1988. Observed hedging ratios were
below the ranges suggested in the literature on optimal hedging strategies. This identifies a need
64
for further research to establish appropriate recommended hedging ratios suitable for South
African commercial maize farmers.
Amongst maize marketing intermediaries, elevators (eg. cooperatives and former cooperatives)
handle approximately half of the value of the annual maize crop in the study areas. Commercial
users (eg. millers) directly bought 15 percent of study farmers' annual maize output. Small
traders/agents handled roughly 10 percent, and large traders (eg. Louis Dreyfus) another 10
percent of study farmers' annual maize crops. Study trends suggest that the maize marketing role
of large traders in South Africa seems set to increase. Those Internet-based maize trading systems
still operating did not account for a significant proportion of the maize traded in the study areas,
probably due to some of the previously discussed institutional problems associated with such
systems, rather than a lack of Internet access amongst farmers.
Study trends showing continuing change in, and increases in the number of, maize marketing
alternatives chosen by sample farmers over the last, current and forthcoming marketing seasons,
indicate that these farmers are adapting over time to the unregulated marketing environment that
they now face. As local commercial farmers gain experience in the new marketing environment,
their range of maize marketing strategies will likely become more stable, and further research
into the level of, and reasons for, producers' use of different marketing channels will be needed.
Although most sample respondents considered that maize marketing in South Africa was
competitive, a significant proportion of respondents (43 percent) disagreed with this view. The
majority of these farmers felt that maize prices were being manipulated by buyers to the
detriment of farmers. Local commercial maize farmers may use S AFEX maize Futures prices to
predict future maize spot prices for planning and budgeting purposes, since SAFEX prices reflect
(almost) all publicly available information in the maize market. Recent research by Wiseman et
al (1998) shows that the SAFEX (AMD) futures market is becoming increasingly efficient.
Farmers should use SAFEX (AMD) Futures prices as guidelines in "discovering" maize cash
prices during negotiations with grain handlers and millers. Producers should also monitor their
local basis (the difference between the local spot price and the nearby Futures price) to identify
profitable opportunities for the transportation and/or storage of maize. Farmers' concerns
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regarding maize price manipulation may arise from their perceived lack of marketing
management skills. This indicates that maize producers require further education on the use, costs
and benefits of available marketing alternatives. Maize marketing seminars and programmes, and
articles in weekly agricultural magazines may be the most effective means of educating maize
farmers. Various institutions such as SAFEX and certain elevators are already actively involved
in producer education and may be persuaded to combine their efforts to provide a forum for the
discussion of the merits of various maize marketing alternatives. Contributors to such extension
efforts could include marketing service providers (eg. SAFEX), elevators (eg. Cooperatives),
producers' organisations (eg. NAMPO), private consultants and millers. Costs of seminars and
programmes could be shared between institutions wishing to promote themselves and seminar
participants, whereas magazines would likely publish quality contributions free of charge .
Factors associated with higher- and lower-level use of price risk management tools were
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Higher-level users, as defined by an
index of price risk management score, tended to operate larger farms, and be younger, less
experienced, but more educated operators who were less likely to individually own their
operations. Due to their relative size, these larger-scale maize farmers are able to spread both the
benefits and fixed costs of seeking information about, and using forward pricing tools over a
larger volume of production. The rate of computer adoption over the sample was higher than in
previous (KwaZulu-Natal) commercial farm studies and was greater amongst higher-level users
of price risk management tools. However, lower-level users of price risk management
mechanisms were also more likely to individually own their farms.
Factors found to positively influence maize producers' use of price risk management tools in the
OLS regression model included use of maize storage facilities, off-farm employment, use of
formal crop insurance, operators' number of years of formal education and the proportion of farm
turnover arising from maize. Operators self-rated score of marketing management ability was
negatively related to their use of price risk management tools.
Farmers who are able, both physically and financially, to use maize storage facilities are more
likely to use sequential marketing. Maize storage activities incur price risk and are thus positively
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related to use of price risk management tools such as hedging. Most respondents (70 percent)
are storing at least a portion of their maize (either on-farm or with elevators), implying that
storage can be a profitable activity for sample commercial maize farmers. Off-farm employment
tends to give farmers greater exposure and access to price risk management tools.
Crop insurance cover implies aversion to yield risk, and producers with such formal crop
insurance are thus likely to be concerned about income risk. Crop insurance is also
complementary to the use of forward-pricing tools which require that physical delivery of maize
be guaranteed. Producers contemplating using forward-pricing tools should consider that these
tools may increase their exposure to yield risk if applied to too high a percentage of the crop, re-
iterating the need to establish some guidelines on appropriate hedging ratios for South African
maize farmers.
The use of price risk management tools is expected to increase with operators' education since
the transaction costs associated with adoption will be lower for such producers. More specialised
maize producers may allocate a greater amount of management time to. and reap greater benefits
from price risk management.
Many producers perceive the maize cash (spot) market to be subject to buyer manipulation
because of a lack of price transparency. Some would advocate state intervention in the provision
of local price information. It would be a very difficult and expensive exercise to continually
monitor maize transactions in various regions, maize Hading in many areas is illiquid and spread
over time. Farmers should rather compare the spot prices they are offered by buyers locally, with
the nearby Futures price and determine the basis, they may use this as a proxy for the cost of
transport and storage in their negotiations with buyers. Information-provision opportunities for
consultants and NAMPO lie in the estimation of actual transport and storage costs to compare
with the calculated basis.
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SUMMARY
Maize is a very important crop in South Africa, both as a human staple diet and animal feed
(especially in the poultry industry). The market for maize in South Africa is characterised by
volatile prices, due mainly to the price-inelastic nature of maize demand and large shifts in the
local supply curve, caused by the vagaries of the weather. The limits on maize price fluctuations
imposed by net import and export parity are wide because major maize markets are far from
South Africa and transport costs are high. Government intervention in maize marketing started
in the 1930's with the aim of stabilising prices. The single-channel maize marketing policy used
to pursue this objective incurred high social costs and the Maize Board was abolished by the
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of October 1996. Producers must once again manage
maize marketing and associated price risk themselves since maize marketing in South Africa is
now almost completely free of government price support. Maize cash (spot) prices are now
volatile, vary between localities and are difficult to monitor since individual transactions are
invisible to other market participants.
Recent, rapid advances in the field of Information Technology have had applications to maize
marketing. The applications available to South African maize producers range from maize
marketing information provision, analysis and communication, to electronic and Internet-based
maize trading systems. Direct applications of Information Technology to maize marketing, for
example in Internet trading systems, appear to be limited less by a lack of farmer access to the
technology, but by institutional problems with these systems, which mostly affect buyers. The
more successful applications of Information Technology to maize marketing have been made in
the analysis and communication of marketing information to farmers.
In the absence of the Maize Board, a variety of price risk management mechanisms have evolved
to serve maize farmers; these range from sequential marketing, to forward contracting to
derivatives hedging with Futures and Options. These price risk management tools may be
substituted for each other and it would be unwise to consider any of them in isolation. Various
previous studies have considered adoption of a single marketing alternative, such as Futures
hedging, but no studies were found which considered farmers' use of a range of substitutable
price risk management tools.
Many of the same factors examined by these previous studies into farmers' use of individual
marketing alternatives were postulated to influence use of price risk management. A
questionnaire was developed in order to measure these personal and business characteristics of
farmers as well as their marketing behaviour. This questionnaire was used in a 1998 postal survey
of a sample of 800 NAMPO members drawn from the major maize producing regions of South
Africa. A useable response rate of 11.4 percent was achieved in this survey.
Respondents tended to comprise large, specialist maize producers. Mean annual maize
production was 918 ha per farm and mean turnover was R 2.9 million, of which 68 percent was
derived from maize. Respondents rated maize price variability as only the joint fourth most
important source of risk they faced, in contrast to previous studies, where it was generally rated
second after maize yield variability. This reflects farmers' increased concerns about financial
instability and labour market inflexibility. Respondents rated their marketing management ability
lowest, relative to other aspects of management and a trend of decreasing levels of understanding
was discovered as complexity of price risk management tools increased from forward contracting
through Futures hedging to Options hedging. This indicates that scope does exist for educational
programmes explaining how various price risk management tools can be used by farmers.
Weekly agricultural magazines, farmers' days and maize marketing seminars may be effective
mediums for farmer education.
The majority of respondents utilised a portfolio of marketing channels. Sample farmers were
making increased use of the forward contracting market relative to the spot market. On-farm use
of maize is increasing. Farmers' direct use of SAFEX for Futures and Options contract trading
has also increased markedly and looks set to rise further as farmers adjust their maize marketing
strategies to the present unregulated marketing environment. Futures hedging ratios were below
those levels suggested in optimal hedging literature. This may be due to farmers' use of other risk
management tools as substitutes for hedging. There is a need for further research to estimate
recommended hedging ratios for South African maize farmers. Elevators (including cooperatives
and former cooperatives) continue to handle the highest proportion of the maize crops in the
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study regions, while the role of large traders looks set to increase further. There is also limited
evidence that on-farm use of maize (vertical integration) will likely grow.
An index was created to quantify the degree of use of price risk management tools amongst
sample farmers. Respondents were divided into lower- and higher-level users of price risk
management mechanisms based on their index scores. Higher-level users of forward pricing tools
tended to have larger, slightly more diversified farms, and be younger, less experienced, more
educated operators and who made more use of maize storage facilities and were less likely to
own their own farms. Due to their relative size, these larger-scale maize farmers are able to
spread both the benefits and fixed transaction and information costs associated with price risk
management tools over a larger volume of production. The rate of computer adoption over the
sample was higher than in previous (KwaZulu-Natal) commercial farm studies and was greater
amongst higher-level users of price risk management tools. Lower-level users of price risk
management mechanisms were also more likely to individually own their farms. Farm size
measures were found to be positively related to the use of price risk management tools because,
as farm size increases, both the fixed costs and the scale dependent benefits of hedging may be
spread over a larger volume of output.
Younger, less experienced, but more educated farmers may be more likely to be early adopters
of price risk management because they are less used to the previous, regulated maize marketing
environment. Such operators may also be less established farmers who are more vulnerable to
price risk.
The negative relationship between individual ownership and degree of use of forward pricing
may be due to co-variance between farm size and ownership structure; larger farms, which are
postulated to be more likely to use forward pricing mechanisms as fixed transaction and
information costs and scale-dependent benefits can be spread over a larger volume of output, are
also less likely to be individually owned. In addition, the results may indicate that alternative
business structures to individual ownerships may demand a higher degree of price risk
management than individual ownerships as the implications of price risk are often not limited
to a single individual.
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to examine the effects of business and
personal characteristics on the maize price risk management activities of the sample of South
African maize producers. Results indicate that use of maize storage facilities, off-farm
employment, use of formal crop insurance, operators' number of years of formal education and
the proportion of farm turnover arising from maize all positively influence producers' use of
price risk management tools. Operators' self-rated score of marketing management ability was
found to be negatively related to use of price risk management tools, in contrast to previous
studies.
Farmers who are able, both physically and financially, to make use of maize storage facilities are
more likely to use sequential marketing. Maize storage activities incur price risk and are thus
positively related to use of price risk management tools such as hedging. The fact that most
respondents (70 percent) are storing at least portion of their maize (either on-farm or with
elevators) implies that storage can be a profitable activity for farmers who are both physically and
financially able to use it. Off-farm employment tends to provide farmers with greater exposure
and access to price risk management tools.
Crop insurance cover implies aversion to income risk, and producers with such formal crop
insurance are thus likely to also be concerned with price risk. Crop insurance is also
complementary to the use of forward-pricing tools which require that physical delivery of maize
be guaranteed. Producers contemplating use of forward-pricing tools should consider that these
tools may increase their exposure to yield risk if applied to too high a percentage of the crop. Use
of price risk management tools is expected to increase with operators' education since the
transaction costs associated with adoption will be lower for such producers. More specialised
maize producers may allocate a greater amount of management time to, and reap greater benefits
from using price risk management tools.
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TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PRINCIPAL FARM DECISION-MAKER
Preliminary notes:
This survey aims to investigate your use of, and attitudes towards, various marketing alternatives
for maize. The study will help providers of marketing services to identify how they can




* Should you not wish to recieve a copy of the results of this study, please do not
include this information.
The following questions deal with geueral charicteristics of you and your farm business:
3. What is your age? Years
4. How many years of farming experience (since age 18) do you have? Years
5. How many years of formal education (eg. Matric =12 years, 3-year degree/diploma =
15 years)
do you have? Years
does your spouse have? Years
6.1 Are you the owner or shareholder of the farmbusiness? (Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
6.2 Are you a manager of the farm business? (Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
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7. Which of the following phrases best describes your farm business.







8. This question deals with off-farm income earned by yourself and your spouse in 1997.
(Please tick the appropriate block)
Did you or your spouse have off-farm employment in
1997?
If so. was it part-time (P) or full-time (F)?





























Please provide details on your main enterprises in the 1997/98 production season. For
size, please use the measure given in brackets after the enterprise. For gross income,























income in a normal
year(R)
Enterprise income as
a percentage of total
income (%)
100%
12. Approximately what proportion of your annual maize hectarage is under irrigation?








14. Please rate your management ability (relative to other farmers in your district) in the
following areas of management: (Please circle the relevant number, where 1= poor





























15. Please rate your willingness to take risks (relative to other farmers in your district) on
the following 5-point scale, where 1 = risk avoider (highly risk averse), 3 = risk neutral
and 5 = risk lover (highly risk preferring): (Please circle the relevant number)
Willingness to take risks
16. Do you utilise maize storage facilities at a Cooperative? (Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
17. Do you have maize storage facilities on your farm? (Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
18. If you do have maize storage facilities on your farm, approximately what percentage of
your annual crop can you store on-farm?
19. Do you plan to expand your on-farm maize storage facilities in the future?
(Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
82
20. Please rate the importance of the following sources of risk facing your farm business on
a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = not important and 5 = very important (where a risk source
is not applicable, tick the N/A box):
Source of risk
Variability in crop yields
Variability in crop prices
Changes in input costs (eg. fertiliser, chemicals, feed)
Changes in interest rates
Changes in the Rand exchange rate
Changes in labour legislation
Further reduction in import tariffs





1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
21. What is the total value of your farm assets (ie. realistic market value of land, fixed
improvements, machinery, livestock, etc.) as at your most recent financial year-end?
R
Financial year-end (date):








To be repaid within a year (eg. bank overdraft, current installments on medium
and long-term debt)
To be repaid within two to five years (eg. hire-purchase principal)
To be repaid over more than five years (eg. mortgage bond principal)
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23. What was your farm business' gross income (turnover) for the most recent financial year
(eg. 1997/98)?
R
24. With regards to telephone and fax facilities, please indicate whether you have access to
the following: (Please tick the appropriate block)
PARTY-LINE DIRECT LINE CELL PHONE FAX
25. Do you own a computer for use in the farm business? (Please circle yes or no)
YES NO
26. Do you have access to the Internet? (Please circle yes or no)
YES NO
27. If you do have access to the Internet, please indicate whether you use it for the following











The following questions deal with the marketing of your maize.
28. Are you in favour of more or less government intervention in agricultural marketing?
(Please tick less, more or unsure)
LESS MORE UNSURE
29. How well do you understand the concept of FORWARD CONTRACTING?
(Please tick the appropriate box)
WELL LITTLE NOT AT ALL
30. How well do you understand the concept of FUTURES CONTRACT TRADING
through SAFEX?(Please tick the appropriate box)
WELL LITTLE NOT AT ALL
31. How well do you understand the concept of OPTIONS TRADING through SAFEX?
(Please tick the appropriate box)
WELL LITTLE NOT AT ALL
32. Do you believe that trading in futures and options contracts on SAFEX will increase
your expected income?(Please tick the appropriate box)
YES NO UNSURE
Do you believe that trading in futures and options contracts on SAFEX will reduce
product price variabiliry?(Please tick the appropriate box)
YES NO UNSURE
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34. To what degree do you use, and are you aware of, the following marketing channels for
your maize? Please indicate what percentage of your 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/2000
(anticipated) crop you sold, or anticipate marketing through the following marketing
channels
Marketing channels for maize
Used on-farm (eg. fed in feedlot)
Milled on-farm for sale or rations
Sold to private users
Sales to elevators co-operatives/ex-cooperatives
Back-to-back
Forward Contracted
'Agterskot' or pool price system
Sales direct to commercial users
Spot market (Silo certificate)
Forward contract
Sales to large traders (eg Dreyfus)
Spot market (Silo certificate)
Forward contract
Sales to/via traders and small traders
Spot market (Silo certificate)
Forward contract
Hedged on SAFEX
Futures contract closed out prior to delivery
Delivered on Futures contract
Hedged on Options market
Sold through Internet marketing system (eg. Agrilink)
Sold through electronic marketing system (eg. Agmex)
Were you
previously aware of
the existence of this
marketing
channel? (Please






















































*Please estimate how much you anticipate using these marketing channels in the 1999/2000 marketing season.
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3 5. Have you had, or do you know anyone who has had a bad experience with the following














36. Please identify the importance of the following factors restricting your use of futures
contracts for hedging on SAFEX: (Please tick the relevant category)
Factor limiting use of SAFEX
Lack of knowledge
Not enough time to investigate
Too much speculation and manipulation
Morally wrong to use such tools
Waiting to see if it works for others





37. Did you use a marketing agent and/or private consultant to advise on the marketing of
your maize during the most recent marketing year? (Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
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38. Please rate the importance of the following sources of market price information to
the marketing of your maize in 1997, using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = limited value and




Television and radio reports
SAGIS (previous Maize Board)
Specialised, subscription-based information providers (eg.
Agrimark Trends/NAMPO TV)
Weekly agricultural magazines (eg. Fanner's Weekly, Landbou
Weekblad)
Agricultural newsletters








Importance (1 to 5)
Low High
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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39. On average, how many hours per week do you spend reviewing maize marketing
information.
Hours
40. What additional information and services do you require for the management of price
risk in the marketing of your maize? (Please tick relevant boxes)
Information or service required
Education on futures and options trading (SAFEX)
Price forecasts
Accurate long-term weather forecasts
Information on trends in international markets
Marketing agents to arrange your marketing for you
Other (Please specify)
41. Do you consider maize marketing in South Africa to be competitive?
(Please tick yes or no)
YES NO
42. Briefly justify your answers to the previous question.
THANK-YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY




COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHER- AND LOWER-LEVEL USERS
OF PRICE RISK MAN A GEMENT
Characteristic
Farm size and enterprise mix measures:
Mean total farm area (ha)
Mean farm arable area (ha)
Mean area under - Maize (ha)
White maize (ha)
Yellow maize (ha)
Mean annual farm turnover (Rm)
Farm business characteristics:
Individual ownerships (% of respondents)
Debt:asset ratio
Make use of maize storage facilities
(% of respondents)






Computer adoption (% of respondents)





























































* ** * * # Denote statistically significant differences between mean values at 10, 5 and
percent levels of probability respectively.
